Trust-building and leadership in multi-stakeholder forums: lessons from Indonesia

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HIGHLIGHTS

- This paper explores trust and leadership as nurturing conditions for collaboration in multi-stakeholder forums (MSFs).
- Research was carried out with three subnational MSFs in Indonesia: the Adaptive Collaborative Management MSF in Jambi, the Regional Council for Climate Change in East Kalimantan, and the Integrated Water Resources Management Investment Program in West Java.
- Findings reveal that a charismatic leader who is trusted by MSF participants can effectively facilitate a forum's process by mediating different and often conflicting interests; conversely, shared leadership might only work when participants already have a feeling of ownership towards the MSF.
- An MSF's design should take into account participants' previous experiences and relationships, as prior informal relationship can help trust-building in the MSF.
- A conscious effort to level the playing field within an MSF may help to build trust among participants and towards the forum itself.

SUMMARY

Multi-stakeholder forums (MSFs) are coordination spaces that enable discussions, negotiations, and joint planning between different kinds of actors. Proponents of MSFs claim that bringing different actors to the same table may help solve complex problems. Nevertheless, an MSF's process and outcomes are affected by its leadership and whether participants are able to trust each other. This paper examines the influence of trust and leadership in three MSFs addressing land and resource use in three subnational jurisdictions in Indonesia. The comparative analysis of semi-structured and Q-methodology interviews carried out with MSF participants and non-participants demonstrates the following. First, that the presence of conflicting interests of different stakeholders can hinder trust-building and cooperation. Understanding the historical relationships between stakeholders, including any positive informal relationships, is necessary to build a better strategy to handle antagonism and improve collaboration. Second, different challenges within MSFs require different kinds of leadership. A shared leadership may work in an MSF with participants with a history of positive relationships. A charismatic leader is preferable in MSFs with conflicts of interest or where participants are yet to trust each other.

Keywords: multi-stakeholder forum, collaboration, trust-building, leadership, Indonesia

Renforcement de la confiance et composition de la direction dans les forums multipartites: lecons venant d'Indonésie

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Les forums multipartites (MSFs) sont des espaces de coordination permettant discussions, négociations et des planifications jointes entre différentes sortes d'acteurs. Ceux qui soutiennent les MSFs clament que le fait de réunir des acteurs différents à la même table peut aider à résoudre des problèmes complexes. En revanche, les processus et les résultats des MSFs sont affectés par sa direction et par la nature aléatoire de la confiance des participants entre eux. Ce papier examine l'influence de la confiance et de la direction dans trois MSFs se concentrant sur la terre et l'utilisation des ressources dans trois juridictions infranationales en Indonésie. L'analyse comparative d'interviews semi structurels et de méthodologie Q auprès de participants et de non participants au MSF indique les points suivants: tout d'abord, la présence de conflits d'intérêt entre les différentes parties prenantes peut freiner le renforcement de confiance et la coopération. Il est nécessaire de comprendre les relations historiques entre les parties prenantes, toute relation informelle positive inclue, pour pouvoir construire une meilleure stratégie pour faire face aux antagonismes et améliorer la collaboration. Ensuite, différents défis dans les MSFs requièrent différents types de direction. Une direction partagée pourrait fonctionner dans un MSF comprenant des participants connaissant historiquement des relations positives. Par contre, un directeur charismatique est préférable dans les MSFs connaissant des conflits d'intérêt ou, où les participants doivent encore apprendre à se faire mutuellement confiance.

Confianza y liderazgo en foros multiactor: lecciones de indonesia

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Los foros multiactor (FMA) son espacios de coordinación que permiten el diálogo, la negociación y el planeamiento conjunto entre diferentes tipos de actores. Aquellos que abogan por los FMA consideran que el traer a diferentes actores a la misma mesa permite la resolución de problemas complejos. Sin embargo, el nivel de complejidad y la naturaleza de los problemas a abordar, la confianza entre los participantes, y el liderazgo dentro FMA influyen en la dinámica de estos procesos. Este artículo examina la influencia de la confianza y el liderazgo en tres FMA que abordan problemas relacionados al uso y cambio de uso del suelo organizados en tres jurisdicciones sub-nacionales de Indonesia. En primer lugar, los intereses conflictivos de los participantes pueden socavar la construcción de confianza en estos espacios. En segundo lugar, un liderazgo fuerte es clave para apoyar los procesos de los FMA y crear confianza entre los participantes y hacia el FMA mismo. En tercer lugar, los organizadores de los FMA deben tener en cuenta las relaciones históricas entre los participantes, ya que estas pueden influenciar el proceso de los FMA.

INTRODUCTION

Participatory governance in forest management has been proposed as a method of practice to address inequalities by including actors from underrepresented groups in decision-making processeses (Bastos-Lima *et al*. 2017, Sayer *et al*. 2013). Furthermore, engaging multiple stakeholders may lead to more sustainable and equitable results than mainstream decision-making processes (Davies and White 2012, Berkes 2010). Similarly, Ostrom (2010) argues that polycentric governance is more effective in dealing with common-pool resources, as it allows governmental units to interact, cooperate and reform top-down decision-making approaches. One of the participatory governance methods that have gained renewed attention is multi-stakeholder forums (MSFs) (Fowler and Biekart 2017, Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2019a).

MSFs can be defined as "purposefully organized interactive processes that bring together stakeholders to participate in dialogue, decision-making and/or implementation regarding actions seeking to address a problem they hold in common or to achieve a goal for their common benefit" (Sarmiento Barletti *et al*. 2020:2). They have gained popularity especially as a participatory method to enable negotiation between historically underrepresented actors, such as indigenous peoples and local communities, and more powerful actors such as corporations, NGOs and government agencies (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2002). The benefits of MSFs range from upholding human rights and participatory democracy – which defend the key role that local people play in the sustainability of policies and projects – to improving coordination among different sectors (see, e.g., Backstrand 2006, Reed 2008, Reed *et al*. 2009). Proponents argue that MSFs promote equal opportunities for stakeholders to speak, be heard, negotiate, and plan together. MSFs may also allow for knowledge transfer and pave the way to solve challenges that participants hold in common (Rondinelli and London 2003, Selsky and Parker 2005).

The issues tackled by MSFs related to land use and land-use change (LULUC) are complex and include responses to climate change, water scarcity and economic poverty (Ferraro 2015). Dentoni (2018) argues that MSFs or other collaborative governance mechanisms have been devised to solve complex or wicked problems that cannot be solved by one institution or sector alone and need to involve different stakeholders with different values and interests (see also Sachs *et al*. 2011). These problems comprise "multiple, overlapping, interconnected subsets of problems that cut across multiple policy domains and levels of government" (Weber and Khademian 2008: 36). Nevertheless, the presence of multiple and frequently conflictive interests present challenges for stakeholder coordination. Furthermore, MSFs regularly adopt soft mechanisms for the implementation of agreements with no legal obligations and sanctions, which could lead to increase conflict among participants (Menna and Palazzon 2012). Therefore, a nurturing environment for collaboration is needed to face those challenges.

Given the importance placed on them by research participants and scholars working on participatory processes, this paper discusses trust (Fisher and Brown 1989, Ansel and Gash 2007, Emerson *et al*. 2011, Edelenbos and Klijn's 2014, Alfantoukh *et al*. 2018) and leadership (Aulich 2009, Orihuela 2017) as two of the factors that can create a nurturing environment for collaboration in an MSF (see Sarmiento Barletti *et al*. 2020 for a review that synthesizes a number of different contextual factors that impact on an MSFs process and outcomes). In accordance with the often cited notion that 'context matters' in participatory processes, the paper argues that different MSFs require different kinds of leadership based on the context where they were organized. These contexts include the trust held among MSF participants before the organization of the MSF.

Research on MSFs in Indonesia is still limited, especially on the role of trust and leadership in their processes. Fahmi *et al*. (2003) analyzed several MSFs in Indonesia's forestry sector; yet, they only provided a brief analysis of the factors affecting the effectiveness of each MSF. Three MSFs at the subnational level in Indonesia are analysed in this paper: The Adaptive Collaborative Management MSF in Jambi (ACM-Jambi), the Regional Council on Climate Change (Dewan Daerah Perubahan Iklim/DDPI) in East Kalimantan and the Integrated Water Resources Management Investment Program (ICWRMIP) in West Java. The paper presents an in-depth comparative analysis of these case studies to understand the implications of trust and leadership in the

MSFs' ability to solve complex problems. The paper will contribute to the scholarly discussion on trust and leadership and further add a more nuanced perspective to the general study of MSFs.

Trust and leadership as nurturing conditions for MSFs

Trust is a "psychological state that exists when you agree to make yourself vulnerable to another because you have positive expectations about your current and future experiences" (Robbins and Judge 2010, cited by Awan 2014: 45). Trust has been recognized as an essential factor for collaboration as it motivates cooperation among stakeholders (Fisher and Brown 1989). Trust enables and makes collaboration more sustainable, while also allowing for commitment to the process to develop more efficiently, as people know the intentions of their fellow participants (Ansel and Gash 2007, Emerson *et al.* 2011). Furthermore, trust allows for increased innovation and problem-solving because trusting partners perceive that other participants have the same desire to work on a common solution (Edelenbos and Klijn 2014). Edelenbos and Klijn's (2014) study about a Public-Private Partnership Project showed that most participants (58%) agreed on the importance of trust in participatory processes. Nonetheless, building trust requires time (Warner 2006). Trust is not only a product of continuous discussion and interaction; it is also a precondition for it (Edelenbos and Klijn 2014). Trust-building is also a cycle – past positive experiences can encourage the development of trust among actors, and negative ones can hinder this process (Vangen and Huxham 2003). Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000) identify three factors affecting trust development: an actor's personality, the rules and norms in an institution or society and actors' previous experiences. Likewise, Getha-Taylor *et al.* (2018:1) listed 'reciprocal favors, repeated illustrations of integrity, participation and feedback as well as procedural justice' as factors affecting trust-building.

Leadership is another key aspect that enhances collaboration within MSFs. Besides facilitating dialogue, leadership can also influence trust-building in collaboration processes (Ansell and Gash 2007). This is due to the presence of what Aron and Aron (1986) call 'self-expansion', "a process that occurs in close relationships, where one person will include another into his or her concept of the self". Leadership in collaborative governance serves various functions, from "promoting and safeguarding the process" to "empowering and representing weaker stakeholders" (Ansell and Gash 2007). Nonetheless, the different contexts in which MSFs are organized require different leadership styles. Professional mediators or actors perceived by the participants to not have vested interests in the issues discussed by an MSF maybe best where conflicts are predominant and trust is low but power distribution is relatively equal (Ansel and Gash 2007). On the other hand, when power distribution is asymmetric or the incentive to participate is weak, a previously recognized leader who is respected by other stakeholders is preferable to give legitimacy to the process (Ansell and Gash 2007, Orihuela 2017). This type of leadership stresses the

value and characteristic of the individual leader, leader's charisma, resulting from their skills or appearance, as it influences coordination and cooperation processes (Grabo and van Vugt 2016). Finally, leadership can also be understood as a group product. Danserau *et al.* (2013) propose shared leadership as a type of traditional group-oriented leadership. Shared leadership is when the leadership role and responsibilities are distributed among a group of individuals or as Martin *et al.* (2018) defines it "leadership that emanates from the members of teams and not simply from the appointed team leader". This type of leadership highlights inter-dependence among different members.

METHODS AND CONTEXT

This paper presents the results of a comparative study on subnational MSFs carried out by the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) during 2018–2019. A total of 14 MSFs that were set up to achieve more sustainable land or resource use were studied in Ethiopia, Indonesia, Brazil and Peru (Sarmiento Barletti and Larson 2019b). This paper focuses on the three MSFs in Indonesia: The Adaptive Collaborative Management MSF in Jambi (ACM Jambi), the Regional Council on Climate Change (Dewan Daerah Perubahan Iklim/DDPI) in East Kalimantan and the Integrated Water Resources Management Investment Program (ICWRMIP) in West Java.

Data collection

The three MSFs were selected after a scoping study that examined various subnational multi-stakeholder initiatives in Indonesia that dealt with land use and land-use change issues (LULUC). These MSFs were selected because they were organized at the subnational level (and there is a lack of research on subnational MSFs); they all had at least one government and one indigenous or local organization actor; and they addressed land or resource use issues. Stakeholder mapping and snowball sampling were conducted to identify the respondents for each MSF. First, the stakeholders participating in each of the MSFs were mapped. Second, the lists of potential informants were cross-checked with MSF organizers to select the people to be interviewed. Interviewed stakeholders represented the different types of actors participating in each MSF: government (national and subnational), NGOs, private sector, civil society organizations, local communities, and academia. A total of 131 interviews were conducted: 48 in ACM Jambi, 41 in DDPI and 41 in ICWRMIP.

Structured interviews (Table 1) were carried out with four different groups: key context respondents (for an integrated understanding of the context in which the MSFs were organized), MSF organizer(s) and participants, as well as relevant stakeholders who did not participate in these MSFs for different reasons. Interviews aimed to inquire about the MSF's context, design and objective(s), and explore its equity and effectiveness from the perspectives of participants and non-participants.

TABLE 1 *Number of Study Respondents*

	ACM (Jambi)					DDPI (East Kalimantan)					ICWRMIP (West Java)				
	KC	O	P	NP	Total	KC	O	P	NP	Total	KC	O	P	NP	Total
NGO	2	2	5	5	**14**	1	1	8	5	**15**	-	-	3	3	**6**
Private sector	1	-	-	-	**1**		-	1	2	**3**	-	-	-	-	**0**
Academia	1	2	1	-	**4**	1	-	2	3	**6**	-	2	1	-	**3**
National government	1	-	-	-	**1**	1	-	4	-	**5**	2	-	2	-	**4**
Subnational government	-	1	2	-	**3**	-		11	-	**11**	-	-	4	-	**4**
Local community	-	-	20	5	**25**	-	-	-	-	**0**	-	-	14	7	**21**
Donor	-	-	-	-	**0**	-	1	-	-	**1**	2	1	-	-	**3**
Total	5	5	28	10	**48**	3	2	26	10	**41**	4	3	24	10	**41**

Notes: KCI: Key Context Interview; O: Organizer; P: Participants; NP: Non-Participant

Q-methodology interviews were also carried out with MSF organizers and participants. This method combines quantitative and qualitative analysis and was selected to comparatively examine how the participants perceived MSFs as a method of practice (Watts and Stenner 2019). Interviews consisted of 42 statements describing different aspects of MSFs as participatory processes. These statements covered four main topics: the design of MSFs; their opportunities and benefits; their difficulties and challenges; and alternative approaches. These statements were written and developed after a literature review on MSFs and scoping research in Brazil, Peru, Ethiopia and Indonesia before conducting data collection. Additionally, the list of statements was peer-reviewed by specialists and were further refined after pilot implementation in Peru. After, the statements were translated into the languages used at the research sites. Participants received these statements (each written on a card) and a grid (Figure 1). Then, they placed the cards according to how much they agreed (+4) or disagreed (-4) with them on the grid. After each participant finished sorting the cards, a follow-up interview was conducted to understand their sorting and to carry out a more in-depth analysis of their perceptions. The full Q-methodology tool can be found in Sarmiento Barletti and Larson (2019b).

FIGURE 1 *Q-methodology grid*

Data Analysis

Data collected through structured interviews was systematized and analyzed case by case through qualitative data coding. For the Q-analysis, each dataset was entered into the factoring software (KenQ analysis). Separate Q-databases from each case were used to allow more detailed analysis and to be able to compare across them. A preliminary factor extraction for all datasets, consisting of seven factors (groups), was initially done. Each factor represented a group of participants with similar perspectives on MSFs. The analysis was continued by reducing the initial seven factors to a smaller number of factor groups that complied with the following: the Kaiser-Guttman criteria, Scree Test, and by considering the explained variance and number of participants significantly loaded for each group. The resulting factor groups fulfilled all expected parameters; they were each loaded with at least 5% of participants, had a composite reliability of more than 0.9 and a cumulative explained variance of more than 40% (see Steener and Watts 2012, Eghbalighazijahani *et al.* 2013). Following factor extraction, varimax rotation was applied. The distribution of participants across factors was done according to the loadings – through auto-flagging (to 0.5 significance) and then flagging according to the researcher's criteria, where all factors loaded less than 0.4 were excluded. There were no co-founded cases[1]. Some cases were excluded from subsequent analysis as they were not significantly loaded onto any of the four groups.

In all cases, after excluding those participants who were not significantly loaded to any of the factors, approximately 80% of the participants were loaded into one of the factor groups. This means that a minority (20%) did not fit into any of the factor groups, meaning that their views did not conform to that of any single group. The Q-methodology analysis results in the distribution of participants into factors – or groups, as referred in this paper – according to their Q-sort (how they ranked the statements). Thus, those participants who ranked the statements similarly ended up in the same group.

[1] A co-founded case is when a participant is significantly loaded to more than one factor.

TABLE 2 *Overview*

	Total	Total factorized		Factor						Correlations		
				1		2		3		Factor 1&2	Factor 1&3	Factor 2&3
			#	% (of total factorized)	#	% (of total factorized)	#	% (of total factorized)				
DDPI	27	22	81%	11	50%	6	27%	5	23%	0.70	0.60	0.45
ACM Jambi	34	32	94%	16	50%	16	50%	-	-	0.67	-	-
ICWRMIP	27	21	78%	12	57%	9	43%	-	-	0.65	-	-

In the results section each MSF's findings will be presented separately. For this paper, traditional quantitative analysis of the Q-methodology was not carried out. Instead, the four statements that addressed attributes of trust-building and leadership were chosen to be analyzed in detail to compare participants' perspectives across cases. The statements were:

1. Successful MSFs have an unbiased facilitator.
2. No matter how the MSF is designed, powerful actors always find a way to dominate the conversations held during it.
3. MSFs help solve problems because they bring together government actors (e.g., development and environment planners) that would normally not work together.
4. If participants are too transparent with information, maps and legal documents, others may use that to further their own agendas.

An Overview of the Three MSFs

Although all the MSFs studied (Table 3) dealt with land and resource management, their goals, context, and achievements were different. The following section presents a summary of each case study.

Adaptive Collaborative Management MSF, Jambi Province (ACM Jambi)
Bungo district is located in the Jambi Province and has a total area of 4,659 km². Its economy greatly depends on formal and informal natural resource extraction. During 1990–2002, and until 2 years after the ACM Jambi project and MSF were formed, the district primary forest experienced 12% loss due to extractive activities (Suherman and Taher 2008). The district's forest area is managed by the state, private sector, and also local communities.

Although in the 2000s social forestry schemes offered management rights to the local communities, according to Fisher *et al*. (2018) there was little will on the government's side and no mechanisms to handover forestland management to the local communities. Without any legal rights, neither the communities' role in managing the forest nor their ownership over it were legally recognized. It was not until 2012, that local communities were granted ownership rights, as the constitutional court decision No.36/PU-X/2012 recognized the role of customary communities (*masyarakat adat*) in managing forests and natural resources.

To reduce deforestation and land degradation in the district's forests, CIFOR, in collaboration with Jambi University's Center for Regional Autonomy (PSHKODA) and Gita Buana, a local NGO, implemented the Adaptive Collaborative Management Project. The project was active for six years (2000–2006) in Baru Pelepat Village, Bungo District. Besides focusing on developing the community's capacities and institutions for forest management, project organizers also lobbied at the district level to protect the forest. Furthermore, organizers worked on improving collaboration between the district government and the community. The ACM Jambi project included an MSF (Table 4). As part of the MSF,

TABLE 3 *Comparison across three MSFs in Indonesia*

	DDPI	ICWRMIP	ACM
Goals	Climate Change Coordination	Rehabilitating Citarum River	Deforestation
Governance level	Subnational (province – district) in coordination with national level (national – province)	Subnational, embedded in national-level program.	Subnational (district – village)
Key challenges	Ego sectoral, Inter-sectoral coordination.	Ego sectoral Inter-sectoral/inter-ministerial coordination. Highly politicized problem.	Community's dependency on timber extraction.
Key success factors	Participants acknowledge the importance of MSF in the region. Respected leader eased the coordination process.	Community acceptance of the project at the subnational level.	Trust built among participants. Participants had high commitment with the MSF. Clear and coordinated tasks for each organization involved.

FIGURE 2 *Map of Jambi Province*

TABLE 4 *ACM Jambi MSF*

Year	2000–2006
Objectives	• Raise awareness about the implications of forest destruction and loss of natural resource • Formulate solution with local community in the area
Participants	Subnational government, NGOs, indigenous community and academia

community members worked on restoring and strengthening their traditional environmental knowledge and documenting a set of rules in customary forest management that was agreed to by all of the MSF's participants. To improve and strengthen tenure security and limit future potential threats to their territories and resources, participants used the MSF to coordinate and facilitate the issuance of two regulations[2] that acknowledged customary institutions and forest management. The ACM Jambi MSF provided the time, know-how and budget needed to fulfill the requirements to achieve Baru Pelepat Village's legal recognition for its customary forest (*hutan adat*) from the Government of Indonesia in 2017.

The Regional Council on Climate Change, East Kalimantan Province (DDPI)
East Kalimantan is known for its high biodiversity and valuable timber, as well as its mineral resources such as oil, gas, coal and gold (Van der laan *et al*. 2017). The province's economy largely depends on the extraction of natural resources; 10.32% of the national income depends on it (Subdirektorat statistik ekspor 2019). In this context, land tenure conflicts have been one of the main challenges for East Kalimantan. In 2013, the provincial government found 742 cases of overlapping land claims, which often included mining, industrial forest and oil palm plantations and forest business

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[2] Village regulation no.2 of 2005 on customary forest management and utilization and District regulation no.32 of 2006 which legally recognizes the customary community.

FIGURE 3 *Map of East Kalimantan Province*

rights (Rahmad 2017). In 2015, out of the 89 land tenure conflicts, 62% of these occurred between companies and customary communities (Disbunkaltimprov 2015).

Nevertheless, East Kalimantan has been an active province in terms of its commitment to low emissions development and climate change mitigation. In 2009, Green East Kalimantan, or *Kaltim Hijau*, a pledge made by the province's government to pursue low emissions development, was formulated.

To enhance effective collaboration among stakeholders involved in conservation and climate change, an MSF, the Regional Council on Climate Change (DDPI after its name in Indonesian), was established in 2011. DDPI's main objectives included supporting knowledge transfer and capacity development for participants to achieve East Kalimantan's adaptation, mitigation and low-emissions development goals (see Table 5). Some of DDPI's achievements included improved coordination amongst different stakeholders, influencing the

regulation and policies on sustainable land and resource use in the province, and strengthening the climate change adaptation and mitigation process in the province through the provision of technical support to the provincial government of East Kalimantan. Noticeably, the national government appointed East Kalimantan as a pilot province for a recent FCPF Carbon Fund Program because of the presence of DDPI in 2018, as it was considered this could support the technical process and facilitate cross-sectoral coordination (DDPI Participant, Male, Government Agency, 2018).

The Integrated Water Resources Management Investment Program, West Java Province (ICWRMIP)

The Citarum River is the longest in West Java Province. It is 297 km long and passes through 11 administrative regions, irrigating about 420,000 hectares of agricultural land in the lowland area of northern West Java. It supplies domestic

TABLE 5 *DDPI MSF*

Year	2011– now
Objectives	• Coordinate climate change-related programs in the province • Promote the inclusion of green development and climate change mitigation strategies into subnational government's activities, strategic planning documents and development plans.
Participants	Subnational government, national government, NGOs, academia

FIGURE 4 *Map of Citarum watershed*

water for the population of Bandung (the capital city of West Java Province) and Jakarta. There are three large dams in the river: Saguling, Cirata and Jatiluhur, which provide 1,400 megawatts of electricity, distributed across the islands of Java and Bali. For these reasons, the Citarum River was recognized as a nationally strategic river basin.

Despite its importance, the river suffers from severe contamination as a result of household activities, agriculture, and industries. Pollution has reached dangerous levels and poses a threat to public health (Fulazzaky 2010, Brotosusilo *et al*. 2019, Kartasasmita and Falconer 2017). At the upper stream region of the Citarum watershed, agriculture intensification and expansion are the main drivers of land-use change in the area. This has led to severe soil erosion, flood and sedimentation (Cavelle 2013). Furthermore, the wastewater discharge from the dairy industry and local communities increases the river pollution and further riverbed siltation (Parikesit *et al*. 2005).

Considering the importance of the Citarum watershed and its problems, the Government of Indonesia categorized Citarum as the most critical watershed and most in need of immediate rehabilitation in Indonesia (Venema 2015, Parikesit *et al*. 2005, KemenPU 2012). Yet, neither the provincial or the national goverments have assumed responsibility over it. The provincial government expects the national government to

solve the situation, leading to the emergence of conflicts of interests between government authorities at the national and provincial levels (ICWRMIP organizer, Female, Donor, 2018). Additionally, the lack of coordination between levels has resulted in each administrative region having different development programs and priorities, and in turn, increased pollution in the Citarum watershed (Fulazzaky 2014).

To address these coordination challenges between different stakeholders and jointly act upon Citarum watershed pollution, the Asian Development Bank funded *The Integrated Citarum Water Resources Management Investment Program* (ICWRMIP) in 2019 (Table 6). For this project, several MSFs were created at the national and subnational levels, each of them with different but complementary objectives. This paper analyzes the MSF held at West Java.

RESULTS

Q-methodology analysis results in the grouping of participants with similar perspectives around a topic, in this case MSFs. In the case of ACM Jambi and ICWRMIP, two significant groups were identified; for DDPI, three were identified. Each group has an ideal Q-sort, which represents a synthesis of the perspectives of those participants included in it. For each of

TABLE 6　*ICWRMIP MSF*

Year	2009–2014
Objectives	Program objectives: Citarum River rehabilitation MSF objectives: • At the national level: Inter-ministerial coordination • At the subnational level: Build alliances and coordinate between farmers and the provincial and district level government to assure political and financial support for sustainable interventions in the Citarum river.
Participants	National government, subnational government, NGOs, local community, academia

the groups, the statements received a ranking on a scale that ranged from -4 (meaning that they strongly disagreed with the statement) to +4 (meaning that they strongly agreed with the statement). Table 7 shows the ratings for the statements analyzed for each of the groups identified. Q-methodology analysis will be presented for each MSF, together with extracts of the interviews conducted with participants.

ACM Jambi

The Q-methodology analysis for ACM Jambi resulted in two groups. Group 1 (G1) was dominated by NGO participants (75%) and also included government officials (9%). Group 2 (G2) was divided between local community participants (56%) and government officials (44%). Both G1 and G2 agreed (at +3 in the scale) on the importance of having an unbiased facilitator for an MSFs to be successful. This is probably related to their experience in the ACM Jambi process in which, according to interviews with several participants, the facilitator tried to remain neutral and minimally intervened in the process.

Additionally, it is noteworthy that the MSF did not have a specific coordinator. The decision of not having a specifically designated leader for the MSF was made among its participants. As a result, nobody claimed that the success of the MSF relied on a particular organizer. Furthermore, NGO

informants from G2 stated that participants' mutual recognition of the needs of each other to solve the problem at hand also played a crucial role in shaping cooperation at the MSF. Relationships built prior to the MSF enabled cooperation and coordination among participants.

> *"I love the idea of collaborating as we did in Bungo, also through informal interactions prior to the formal forum; it enabled us to connect more easily with the government. We understood that we needed each other to do our job so that we could help the government to put together a program that was pro-conservation and environment and, at the same time, supported the marginalized community by providing them with useful capacities and information".* (ACM Jambi Participant, Female, NGO, 2018)

Both G1 and G2 disagreed with the statement: "No matter how the MSF is designed, powerful actors always find a way to dominate the conversations held during it." This suggests that MSFs can be planned accordingly to avoid powerful actors from dominating the conversations. In addition to the facilitator's role in reducing the domination of certain stakeholder, the ACM Jambi project also organized capacity development events for historically marginalized actors, especially women. These events allowed for more empowerment and increased confidence among the local community in

TABLE 7　*Q results*

MSF	Statement	Ranking		
		F1	F2	F3
ACM Jambi	Successful MSFs have an unbiased facilitator.	3	3	-
DDPI		2	3	3
ICWRMIP		4	3	-
ACM Jambi	No matter how the is MSF designed, powerful actors always find a way to dominate the conversations held during it.	-1	-1	-
DDPI		-1	-2	2
ICWRMIP		-1	-3	-
ACM Jambi	MSFs help solve problems because they bring together government actors (e.g. Development and environment planners) that would normally not work together.	4	1	-
DDPI		1	2	1
ICWRMIP		1	2	-
ACM Jambi	If participants are too transparent with information, maps and legal documents, others may use that to further their own agendas.	0	-4	-
DDPI		-1	0	-2
ICWRMIP		-1	0	-

voicing their needs and interests; which was noted by 40% of the interviewed participants. The informal and flexible setting of the MSF further contributed to the decreased domination by powerful actors and the increased participation from the less powerful ones.

> *"Local community [members] also participated in the forum. The forum was so informal and flexible (. . .). The less powerful actors felt less pressure compared to participating in a more formal setting."* (ACM Jambi Participant, Male, Government Agency, 2018)

Despite the common perspective held by interviewees in regards to how the MSF balanced participation and avoided the dominance from powerful actors, there were other contrasting points of view. G2 strongly disagreed (-4) with the statement "if participants are too transparent with information, maps and legal documents, others may use that to further their agenda." One participant said that information sharing in MSFs was important to understand the challenge it addresses better and design better solutions. However, G1 held a neutral stance (0) towards this statement. These results suggests that NGO participants (which predominated in G2) had higher levels of trust, in comparison to local people and government agencies (which prevailed in G1). Nevertheless, transparency and information sharing among participants was acknowledged as relevant across MSF's participants.

Finally, the statement "MSFs help solve problems because they bring together government actors (e.g., development and environment planners) that would normally not work together." was ranked +4 by G2, whilst G1 ranked it as 0. Despite G1's lower ranking compared to G2, we have to consider that it was ranked 0, meaning neutral and thus it is not a negative perspective. As G1 was composed mainly of NGO participants, results suggest that NGO participants place more value on other aspects of MSFs than government coordination.

DDPI

Q-methodology analysis for this case study resulted in 3 groups. Group 1 (G1) was dominated by government actors (73%), although it also included NGO participants (27%). Group 2 (G2) was dominated by NGO participants (50%) and also included academia participants (33%) and a small portion of government participants (17%). Finally, Group 3 (G3) was dominated by government participants (60%), followed by NGO participants (40%).

All groups had a positive perception towards the statement "successful MSFs have an unbiased facilitator" (G1 +2, G2 +3, G3 +3). Interviews revealed that MSF participants considered the MSF's facilitator to be unbiased and greatly respected him. As one participant noted, the MSF's effectiveness was greatly influenced by its facilitator:

> *"One of the reasons for DDPI's effectiveness is its public figures. DDPI was effective because of support from Pak Awang [the East Kalimantan previous governor 2008–2018]. Besides, Mr. Daddy as a chairman is also a respected figure. If both were replaced, DDPI's effectiveness would be jeopardized"* (DDPI participant, male, NGO, 2018)

Furthermore, 24% of the interviewed MSF participants noted that the leader played a key role in the MSF's success in terms of cross-sectoral coordination. Most of them admitted that sectoral egos[3] within government agencies were one of the most significant challenges for coordination in the province. Thus, having a respected academic who was not part of any government agency as its leader prevented sectoral ego from influencing the MSF's process. As an interviewee noted,

> *"DDPI has been led by a respected academic who could monitor and supervise the everyday activities of the DDPI. The MSF was also established by the governor, making it easier to coordinate among the government agencies. This wouldn't be the case if the DDPI was attached to a specific government agency, because there's a sectoral ego".* (DDPI participant, Female, NGO, 2018)

Moreover, it seems that the strategy to dialogue and build consensus also helped to build trust towards the facilitator and the process. As one participant stated:

> *"In the beginning, all relevant stakeholders were invited to the forum (. . .) even though they were opposed to REDD+ implementation. The discussion was very open, with very hot debates on the pros and cons of REDD+. DDPI's role was to mediate these discussions and work with those stakeholders who were not convinced by climate change issues. We tried to be inclusive by bringing different stakeholders together in the MSF.* (DDPI participant, Male, NGO, 2018)

This highlights the importance of having a facilitator with conflict management strategies. Moreover, all groups agreed with the statement "MSFs help solve problems because they bring together government actors (e.g., development and environment planners) that would normally not work together." Results suggest that participants perceived the MSF as a successful space for intersectoral government coordination. This needs to be interpreted taking into consideration their perceptions of the key role of an unbiased facilitator to achieve this positive result. Had sectoral egos not

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[3] *Ego sektoral* in Bahasa Indonesia, translated as the feeling of pride of an institution to consider itself as the most credible institution to produce policies and regulations.

been managed, this would not have been achieved. As one interviewee said, the fact that no government agency led the process helped to build a collaborative environment among the different governmental actors, and beyond the government as well:

> *"DDPI tries to connect government officials with other actors. DDPI doesn't act as an implementer, government agencies do. This coordination process becomes difficult when the leader comes from specific government agency due to 'sectoral ego'; among different government agencies present."* (DDPI participant, male, Government Agency, 2018)

Additionally, all groups tended to disagree with the statement "If participants are too transparent with information, maps and legal documents, others may use that to further their own agendas." G3 participants disagreed more (-2) than G2 (0) and G1 (-1) participants. A government participant from G3 said: "When one is committed to take part in the MSF, one must also commit to pursuing transparency in the MSF, and that includes data sharing." This suggests that G3 participants, mainly government and NGOs participants, have more confidence in sharing information and acknowledged the MSF to be a safe place. In contrast, G2 participants, where we also find NGO and academia participants, were less confident towards the transparency of information sharing. These results may suggest that government actors find this space safer for information sharing, in comparison to some NGO participants and academia. A probable reason for this is that the MSF was established by the governor, and therefore government participants could consider it as "their" space.

Furthermore, participants showed contrasting views towards the statement "No matter how the MSF is designed, powerful actors always find a way to dominate the conversations held during it". Whilst G3 showed agreement (+2) over the statement, indicating a higher chance of powerful actors dominating MSFs, G1 (-1) and G2 (-2) manifested disagreement with the statement. This suggests that there is a minority of government officials and NGOs (as they only accounted for 20% of participants) who have a critical view towards powerful actors dominating the MSF. Nevertheless, a G3 government participant explained that domination from some powerful actors is likely to happen, especially in the case of actors that support the MSF financially. An NGO informant also expressed concern about other members' suspicion of possible domination by a participant organization that also funded the MSF: "one of the funding sources for DDPI is coming from an NGO. There is concern that they will drive the forum with their own agenda". These results suggest that it is important to pay attention to the funding of participatory spaces as this can bring doubts over the transparency and fairness of their processes.

On the other side, the majority of interviewees trusted that there would be no domination by powerful actors in general. This is related to the unbiased facilitation process mentioned above. However, it may also be related to the MSF's inclusive

process. MSF participants considered that a very inclusive call for participation was done since the first meetings, even including those who may have opposing views (e.g. those who disagreed with the province's REDD+ strategy). Furthermore, one participant also mentioned that informal conversations were held to include the opinions of those who decided not to participate in the MSF because of their opposing views (DDPI, Male, NGO, 2018).

Additionally, participants' trust on the leader also seems to be influenced by the successes and achievements of the MSF. Results showed that most MSF participants perceived positive results were being achieved, which helped to build more trust towards the process itself. Also, some participants noted that the leader was not only good at managing the MSF but had a good relationship with the government and therefore could scale up the results of the MSF. This suggests that the relation between the facilitator/leader and the government may also be an important quality, as an MSF facilitator may be key to involve the government officers and influence policies.

Moreover, it is important to note that a group of participants, specially from the government and NGOs, acknowledged that their past interactions and history of collaboration contributed to the formation of informal relationships in the MSF which supported coordination processes.

> *"Since I have several projects related to REDD+, I also have frequent interaction with DDPI, especially with Pak Daddy."* (DDPI participant, Male, NGO, 2018)

> *"Most people in DDPI (and NGOs in EK) came from the same university so we've known each other personally"* (DDPI participant, Male, NGO, 2018)

In summary, DDPI shows high levels of trust among its participants, principally among the NGO and government actors. This is related to the MSF's inclusivity, unbiased facilitator and the past history of trust. However, there seems to be a downside to the role of the facilitator on building trust as many participants were worried about what may happen when the leader was replaced.

ICWRMIP

Q-methodology analysis for ICWRMIP MSF resulted in the extraction of two groups. G1 was dominated by local communities (67%) and was also composed of government participants (17%) and universities (17%). G2 did not have a clearly predominant sector: 44% were government representatives, 33% members of local communities, 11% research institutes and 11% NGOs.

Similar to the other MSFs, participants for ICWRMIP agreed on the importance of an unbiased facilitator for the MSF's success; both G1 and G2, strongly agreed (+4 and +3 respectively) with the statement. As explained by an NGO informant, an unbiased facilitator is especially important to gain support from the local communities. In this case the farmers, among which the MSF sought to promote sustainable

agricultural practices. Additionally, as a G1 local community participant explained, an unbiased facilitator helps to build bridges between different actors.

As explained previously, this subnational MSF was related to a national-level MSF. The national MSF had two facilitators which rotated depending on the issues being discussed. Matters on planning and finance would be handled by the National Planning Agency (Bappenas), and matters related to ICWRMIP's activities would be under the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works (PU). Organizers commented that trust-building was one of the main challenges for actors at the national level. This resonates with the Q-methodology results. Participants were only in slight agreement (G1: +1, G2: +2) with the statement "MSFs help to solve problems because they bring together government actors (e.g., development and environment planners) that would normally not work together". Participants manifested that, in practice, the national level MSF did not bring different government sectors to work together.

Informants noted that it was challenging to deal with the Citarum issue at the national level given the necessary intersectoral coordination and cooperation from all relevant stakeholders at the subnational level.

"The process of ICWRMIP was really influenced by political dynamics at the subnational level. Citarum is a cross region problem, there were a lot of different interests, and it was hard to synergize them." (ICWRMIP Participant, Female, Government Agency, 2018)

Likewise, the MSF faced coordination difficulties, which according to six participants was mainly caused by sectoral ego. Participants considered that the ministries involved focused more on their own plans and policies, rather than on ICWRMIP's goals or the condition of the Citarum watershed. As a result, no significant results were perceived to have been achieved by the respondents.

"We worked based on our mandate, as stated by the regulations, and the regulations themselves were sector-specific. Therefore, it was hard to achieve synergy because each agency tends to only care about its target." (ICWRMIP Participant, Male, Government Agency, 2018)

The forum itself lacks quality. (. . .) The national and sub national government's policies contradict each other. They thought that others should be more responsible." (ICWRMIP Organizer, Female, Donor, 2018)

Lack of synergy caused by sectoral ego and the perception of a highly politicized problem influenced trust-building among participants and affected the MSF's ability to achieve its objectives. Five participants from the government and university sector mentioned law enforcement as a critical measure for addressing the Citarum's problems. Another government participant mentioned how the MSF was inefficient and took a long time to produce significant

outcomes. Additionally, results show that coordination was challenged by an unclear organization – participants said that there was not clarity on who reports to whom, lack of accountability, no responsible actors who could ensure implementation of MSF outcomes – and leadership.

"There are so many stakeholders involved in Citarum cases and no leader providing clear guidance. As a result, there was still a lot of overlapping work among MSF participants, there were a lot of 'wait and see' moments and in the end, the coordination process failed." (ICWRMIP Participant, Male, Government Agency, 2018)

Problems with data sharing became another of the MSF's limitations due to a lack of trust among participants. This is reflected in the scores for the statement "if participants are too transparent with information, maps and legal documents, others may use that to further their own agendas." While G1 ranked the statement negative (-1), showing participants to be in slight disagreement, G2 ranked this statement neutral. Overall, these results show low levels of trust, but less so in G2. It is important to note that G2 represented 42% of the participants and had participants from across the different types. Thus, this view is shared by all types of participants. A G2 informant from academia noted the importance of transparency in achieving better results, yet acknowledged the possibility of data leakage that could be used to benefit more powerful actors.

Despite the lack of trust and difficulties, the statement about powerful actors dominating the MSF was ranked negatively by both G1 and G2. This suggests that they are optimistic on the ability of the MSF to provide an equal arena for all stakeholders. A government participant from G1 expressed that "To have a powerful actor is normal, but the MSF must devise a strategy to tackle that". (ICWRMIP Participant, Male, Academia, 2018)

DISCUSSION

Participatory approaches have been acknowledged as ways to solve complex or wicked problems (Sachs *et al.* 2010). Alford and Head (2017) demonstrate the importance of participatory approaches in solving complex problems, not only because problems and solutions can be identified collectively, but also because they enable the mobilization of knowledge and support for solving the problems. Nevertheless, underlying factors such as trust-building and leadership influence MSFs' processes and outcomes. This section discusses the extent to which leadership and trust-building influence the processes of MSFs in achieving their objectives. A comparison of how the participants in each MSF's perceived trust-building and leadership is offered here by taking into account the Q-methodology results, enriched with the responses provided by participants and organizers in their follow-up and structured interviews.

Trust-building and leadership in MSFs

The literature shows that trust among actors is continuously evolving, and previous experiences can set a positive or negative precedent (see Vangen and Huxham 2003). Furthermore, present experiences can reinforce or break previous confidence among participants. The results presented have shown that leadership plays an important role in trust-building among participants and towards the MSF itself. A leader can stimulate more equitable processes in an MSF, as well as foster cooperation among MSF participants (see also Emerson and Gerlak 2014).

Analysis has shown some factors that seem to positively influence trust in the MSF and the role of its leader on it. In the case of ACM Jambi, addressing power inequalities helped trust-building. Power differences among actors were attended by organizing capacity-development activities for the local community to participate in the MSF in more effective ways. This helped to level the playing field with the other more powerful actors. As a result, the MSF successfully fostered an environment where participants felt as equals. Their positive perception towards the lack of domination from powerful actors in the MSF reflects their confidence in the forum's ability to provide an equal arena for different actors (see Getha-Taylor *et al*. 2018) This supports Ran and Qi's (2018) description of the relationship between power and trust, in which trust could be a basis for, or influence, power-sharing in collaborative spaces. The implication of trust can be reflected by participants' positive views on the MSF as a safe arena for knowledge and data exchange. Transparency, according to Rapp (2020), is an aspect that influences an individual's trust toward a system, forming a basis for procedural trust in which they believe the MSF promotes equity and transparency. Additionally, the ACM Jambi case shows how participants' trust towards the process played a role in promoting transparency and equity in the MSF.

Unlike ACM Jambi, whose work focused on one theme – forest governance – and collaborated closely with the local community, DDPI and ICWRMIP faced challenges that required intersectoral collaboration. In this context, sectoral ego became a factor that could potentially inhibit effective collaboration in the MSF. Findings show how the two MSFs dealt with this factor differently and how this affected trust, which played a significant role in addressing the sectoral ego challenge. History of past collaboration clearly influenced relationships among stakeholders in the MSFs. DDPI's participants could maintain an informal relationship through past collaboration, which in turn had a positive influence on the MSF process and avoided sectoral ego. In contrast, the ICWRMIP seemed to be unable to resolve this problem. Addressing the Citarum issue has been a lengthy process with a reputation for being influenced by political dynamics; this jeopardized participants' trust towards the forum's process. The sectoral ego present among government agencies was not addressed, becoming the main barrier for coordination. This case supports Vangen and Huxham (2003)'s argument on how the history of antagonism between stakeholders negatively

affect an MSF's process. In contrast, the previous work carried out by the NGOs and the community helped coordination and cooperation in ACM Jambi. This was similar to the case of DDPI where participants had previous positive relationships. As a result, trust towards the MSF process and among participants increased, and contributed to the MSF's goals achievement. These results support Edelenbos and Klijn (2014) argument that trust is a precondition for effective collaboration.

The sectoral ego problem in the case of DDPI was addressed through its leader and his approach to leadership. The case showed how leadership influenced participants' trust towards the MSF process. Results also showed some distrust related to the potential dominance of donors and their agendas. However, this opinion might have not been shared by many participants because the MSF had a recognized leader that they trusted to be fair. On the downside, despite having a trusted leader, participants felt uncertain towards maintaining an equitable and effective process whenever the leader changed. The leader commanded such respect because he was from academia and thus not considered to have a "sectoral ego", had not been involved in government antagonism problems before, and had qualities for fomenting dialogue and building consensus. However, what makes an "unbiased" leader may change according to an MSF's context.

Conversely, ICWRMIP lacked an unbiased facilitator that knew about conflict management strategies. The MSF failed to achieve an inter-sectoral synergy, which was necessary for an effective coordination process. According to the participants, no remarkable outcomes were achieved during the MSF's process. This negatively affected the perception of participants on the forum's effectiveness, decreasing trust in the process. Even though the MSF succeeded in changing unsustainable farming practices in the upstream region of the watershed to agroforestry, this achievement was overshadowed by the absence of a meaningful outcome at the national level MSF. As a consequence, trust-building among participants and towards the MSF itself was jeopardized, which was reflected in the low level of trust towards the forum from participants across sectors, and in the absence of a significant outcome. The absence of results may be another point to take into consideration when talking about trust in MSFs. Positive results help build trust towards the process and a more collaborative environment can be built, as in the case of DDPI; however, the contrary is true when no positive results are achieved.

This study suggests that different MSFs require different kinds of leadership. Distributional leadership seemed to work well in the ACM Jambi MSF, where social interaction (reciprocal behavior) was one factor that supported effective collaboration. The MSF participants also agreed on the absence of specific coordinator or leader. The trust built throughout the MSF's process strengthened cooperation among participants and contributed to the realization of this type of leadership. The flexible nature of the MSF also allowed for shared leadership.

In contrast, the ICWRMIP and DDPI needed different kinds of leadership to address the existing sectoral ego. The participants of the DDPI MSF perceived good leadership from the individual characteristics of the leader, who considered the different needs of participants and addressed the history of sectoral ego among government agencies. This leadership model could work for ICWRMIP, where a respected leader could focus on building a foundation for collaboration by strengthening relationships and building trust, as well as developing capacities to work together (Imperial 2005). Moreover, as Imperial and Hennessey (2000) suggest, this type of leader should have: facilitation skills to resolve conflicts and persuasion skills. As participants had conflicting points of view and had not previously worked on trust-building, a strong leader with conflict resolution skills would have been key.

CONCLUSION

This paper argued that trust and leadership influence whether MSFs can solve complex problems and achieve their objectives. MSFs have been proposed to have the potential to solve complex problems because they bring together different stakeholders to the same table. However, not all MSFs were able to meet their objectives as they did not establish an enabling environment for collaboration, as illustrated by the ICWRMIP case.

The level of complexity an MSF deals with is affected by the scope of the problem, the actors involved and the relationships among them, and the context in which it is embedded. Building an environment of trust can help to tackle and solve these complex problems. Case studies show that building trust can be done in different ways and requires different kinds of leadership depending on the context.

Sectoral ego has influenced the ability of government sectors in Indonesia to coordinate and collaborate. Therefore, any cross-cutting issues that are meant to be solved through MSFs need to take this matter into account in their design. In the DDPI MSF, leadership played a role in responding to the sectoral ego issue and encouraging a trust-building process. A charismatic leader who is trusted by MSF participants can effectively facilitate a forum's process by connecting different and often conflicting interests. Furthermore, shared leadership, as in ACM Jambi, might only work in cases where members have a strong sense of ownership over the MSF's process. This was enabled by informal relationships built prior to the MSF and a conscious effort to level the playing field in favor of the less powerful actors, which in turn helped to build trust among participants and towards the MSF itself.

Finally, the history of relationships between stakeholders, in terms of collaboration and/or antagonism, is one aspect that organizers should pay attention to in order to devise strategies to contribute towards more effective and equitable MSF processes and outcomes. Identifying this history would be a first step towards taking action in ensuring a trusting environment, and with it, assuring better coordination between stakeholders.

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