

Putting the National back into Forest-Related Policies: the International Forests Regime and National Policies in Brazil and Indonesia

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SUMMARY

The impact of the international forests regime (IFR) in shaping national forest-related policies (FRPs) is often considered as one of the key indicators of its effectiveness. This study is based on a comparison of the evolution over the past three decades of FRPs and the IFR's impact in Brazil and Indonesia – the two top-ranking countries in deforestation figures – and draws two conclusions. First, far from acting as a mere source of resistance to the IFR, the domestic policy context determines both the extent and type of impact of the IFR on FRPs. Secondly, FRPs also influence the IFR, which contradicts the top-down vision put forward by attempts to evaluate the IFR's effectiveness. This suggests that instead of a hierarchical relationship, the link between the national and international spheres is a dynamic one where the IFR and FRPs mutually adjust to each other according to the specificities of policy networks at both levels.

Keywords: forest-related policies, international forests regime, Brazil, Indonesia

Remettre la dimension nationale dans les politiques liées à la forêt: le Régime international des forêts et les politiques nationales au Brésil et en Indonésie

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L'impact du régime international des forêts (IFR) dans la formation des politiques nationales liées à la forêt est souvent considéré comme l'un des indicateurs clés de son efficacité. Cette étude se base sur une comparaison de l'évolution de l'impact de l'IFR et des FRP au Brésil et en Indonésie - les deux pays au plus fort taux de déforestation- au cours des trois décennies passées, et en tire deux conclusions. Tout d'abord, le contexte de politique domestique, loin d'agir comme une source de résistance à l'IFR, détermine plutôt l'étendue et le type de l'impact sur l'IFR et les FRP. Deuxièmement, les FRP influencent aussi l'IFR, contredisant la vision allant du haut vers le bas mis de l'avant par des efforts d'évaluer l'efficacité de l'IFR. Tout cela suggère que le lien entre les sphères nationales et internationales est une relation dynamique, plutôt que hiérarchique, où l'IFR et les FRP s'accordent l'un avec l'autre selon les aspects spécifiques des réseaux de politiques aux deux niveaux.

Devolver lo 'nacional' a la política forestal: el régimen forestal internacional y la política nacional en Brasil e Indonesia

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El impacto del régimen forestal internacional (RFI) sobre las políticas forestales nacionales (PFN) se suele considerar como uno de los indicadores más importantes de su eficacia. Este estudio se basa en una comparación de la evolución durante las últimas tres décadas de PFN y el impacto del RFI en Brasil e Indonesia, los dos países con mayor índice de deforestación, y presenta dos conclusiones. Primero, lejos de actuar como mera fuente de resistencia al RFI, el contexto político nacional determina el alcance y carácter del impacto del RFI sobre la política forestal nacional. En segundo lugar, las políticas forestales nacionales también influyen al RFI, lo cual se contradice con la perspectiva verticalista que han mostrado muchos de los intentos de evaluar la eficacia del RFI. Esto sugiere que, en vez de una relación jerárquica, la relación entre lo nacional y lo internacional es dinámica, y que el régimen forestal internacional y la política forestal nacional se adaptan mutuamente según el carácter específico de las redes políticas a ambos niveles.

INTRODUCTION

The importance of the International Forests Regime (IFR) in shaping national policies and gearing them towards ways in which to curb deforestation and forest degradation is often viewed as a key criterion of the IFR's effectiveness.

This paper provides a study of change in national forest-related policies (FRPs) in order to understand its origins and the relative importance of the IFR in shaping such policies. It focuses on Brazil and Indonesia as two contrasting case-studies that rank top in deforestation figures (see Table 1) and which have greatly contributed to the international debate on forest management. Particular attention is paid to the nature of the relationship between the IFR, domestic FRPs and the broader domestic political contexts.

The data presented below were collected in the field between January and August 2006 for Brazil, and between November 2006 and July 2007 for Indonesia. They originate both from a number of semi-structured interviews carried out in Portuguese, Indonesian, English and French with key actors involved in national FRPs as well as a wide range of grey and academic literature including letters, reports and university publications.

The existing literature tends to remain silent on the definition of forest policies, although from the way the issue is generally treated, it appears that the expression is usually understood as governmental policies that explicitly affect forests. However, two problems appear when trying to operationalise such a definition. First, governments are increasingly both challenged and assisted by an ever growing number of actors involved in forest policies, especially in developing countries where state actors have limited human and financial resources. Secondly, choosing to focus on policies explicitly affecting forests limits the perspective to a small number of policies and closes the door on those from other sectors which might affect forests. This is especially the case in Brazil where forest policies *stricto sensu* were almost non-existent until the 1990s.

In order to include agricultural or industrial policies that have affected forested landscapes in Brazil or Indonesia – sometimes to a greater extent than have forest policies themselves – it is necessary to include all policies that affect forests, whether explicitly or not. Hence the choice of the term “forest-related policies” or FRPs, which can be defined as policies established by governmental and non-governmental actors that affect forest landscapes whether intentionally or not. Policies from sectors other than forests are only included so long as they have an impact on forest landscapes.

This study takes a historical approach to analysing change in FRPs in Brazil and Indonesia and covers the period since the late 1970s, prior to the time when the different components of the IFR first appeared. In general, studies on the IFR have tended to look at international rather than national policies (e.g., Humphreys 1996a, 1996b, 2001, 2007; Smouts 2001); in this paper, however, the author has specifically chosen to tackle the issue from a national perspective – by studying national policies – so as to identify other potential sources of change that might compete or act in synergy with the IFR. In particular, the author focuses on three aspects of FRPs that act as variables for comparing both case-studies:

- Policy discourse, defined here as the rationale for political action or the logical construction of a set of arguments justifying the actions of stakeholders involved in FRPs. Discourse can be identified both in written and oral forms, in interviews as well as in the literature.
- Policy instruments, which Lascoumes and Le Galès (2004) define as “a technical and social device that organises specific social relationships between public authorities and its recipients as a function of the representations and meanings that it bears”.¹
- Policy networks, defined by Le Galès and Thatcher (1995) as “the result of more or less stable non-hierarchical cooperation between organisations that know and recognise each other, negotiate, exchange resources and may share norms and interests (...). The study of policy networks is embedded in a conception of public policies which emphasises their incremental nature and which developed in reaction to the vision of a monolithic state and of a single centre of domination”.²

Partly as a result of the choice, in the existing literature, to focus on the relationship between the IFR and FRPs from the international level, the role of FRPs in this relationship has often been reduced to one of a passive, static receptacle, either permeable or impervious to change. One the one hand, domestic actors and aid recipients frequently overemphasise the progress towards “sustainability” of national policies in a bid to justify donor expenditure, thus portraying FRPs as little more than a receptacle for stimuli induced from the IFR. Paradoxically, actors who denounce what they perceive as unjustified foreign interference in domestic affairs also paint a similar picture of FRPs (although the very fact that they denounce it suggests otherwise). On the other hand, international actors and observers who often express their frustration at the failure of the IFR in modifying FRPs tend to reduce FRPs to a

¹ “Un instrument d'action publique constitue un dispositif à la fois technique et social qui organise des rapports sociaux spécifiques entre la puissance publique et ses destinataires en fonction des représentations et des significations dont il est porteur” (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2004:13).

² “(L)es réseaux sont le résultat de la coopération plus ou moins stable, non hiérarchique, entre des organisations qui se connaissent et se reconnaissent, négocient, échangent des ressources et peuvent partager des normes et des intérêts (...). L'étude des réseaux d'action publique s'enracine dans une conception des politiques publiques qui souligne leur nature incrémentale et qui s'est développée contre la vision d'un Etat monolithique, d'une centre unique de domination” (Le Galès and Thatcher 1995:14).

mere source of resistance to externally induced change.

In this paper, it will be argued that far from being passive or static, FRPs and their broader domestic political context not only play key roles in which IFR-induced changes take place and how, but in some cases they can even influence the IFR in return, hence two hypotheses: first, the IFR can only influence FRPs through the national level that acts as a prism in shaping the IFR's influence; and secondly, the relationship between the IFR and FRPs is two-way as both levels can influence each other.

BRAZIL, INDONESIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL FORESTS REGIME

The IFR in a Nutshell

Given that the focus of this paper is on domestic FRPs, this section only provides a brief overview of the IFR which is analysed in much greater detail in Smouts (2001) and Humphreys (2007).

An international regime is most commonly defined as a framework of "norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner 1983). Many observers continue to question whether the international forests debate may be called a regime, notably because of the absence of a convention and the fact that debates appear so scattered – often reaching well beyond the forest sector – that they lack a common core. However, insofar as (i) forest-related policies are a "given area of international relations" and (ii) the actors involved in these policies at the international level do converge on various sets of "norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures",³ the international debate on forests does fall within Krasner's definition.

With the creation of the International Union of Forest Research Organisations (IUFRO) back in 1896 (Humphreys 2007), international debates on forest management remained on a technical level for many decades, focusing primarily on improving silviculture and timber production. It was not until the 1980s that a handful of NGOs (notably WWF and WRI) began expressing concern at an environmental problem that appeared to be common to all three tropical regions (Latin America, Africa and Asia-Pacific), namely that of deforestation.

1985 marked the beginning of two major initiatives with the launching of the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) and the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP). The following years witnessed a sharp rise in media coverage of a number of events – notably in the Brazilian Amazon – such as the first estimates of deforestation rates and forest fires in 1987 and the assassination of the leader of the Rubber Tapper Movement Chico Mendes in December

the following year. By 1992 when the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was held in Rio, the three following components of the International Forests Regime had come together:

1. An ever-growing number of actors involved in shaping the IFR and linking it with other regimes as well as national policies, including (i) non-governmental organisations, (ii) governmental organisations (UN organisations, International Financial Institutions, bilateral aid donors and governments themselves), (iii) the private sector (notably timber companies and representatives such as federations), and (iv) research organisations and university departments;
2. A flurry of international forums on forests and related issues, especially during the period following the Rio summit which saw a range of forums on forests including the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF, 1995-7), Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF, 1997-2000) and the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF, established 2000). In parallel, deforestation has been linked to adjacent issues – notably biodiversity, poverty reduction and climate change – and has been brought up at a number of events notably in the Johannesburg and Bali Summits (WSSD, 2002 and UNCCC, 2007 respectively); and
3. A wide range of principles or norms that have each dominated international debates on forests at specific and still compete with each other today: (i) conservation *stricto sensu*, promoted mainly in the 1980s by NGOs which advocated timber boycotts and the expansion of protected areas; (ii) participation (early and mid-1990s), whereby local populations are perceived as a solution rather than a threat to forests; (iii) good governance (late 1990s), that emphasises law enforcement and the fight against illegal logging and corruption; (iv) sustainable forest management (early 2000s), which developed from timber certification schemes that portray timber production as a potential means of maintaining forest cover, and (v) avoided deforestation (mid to late 2000s) that focuses on compensating actors for reducing deforestation rates.

To this day, however, the IFR continues to be marred by its lack of coherence, whether in terms of agreements, principles or even the multiplicity of actors who together only contribute further to the impression of cacophony that epitomises international conferences on forestry issues. The absence of a common core in this regime is undoubtedly both the cause and the consequence of the absence of a convention this has characterised other environmental regimes such as biodiversity, the fight against desertification, and climate change. But as suggested below, the absence of coherence

³ Despite the absence of legally binding agreements, actors of the IFR have officially converged several times on a number of issues. The series of action proposals set up by the IPF and IFF in the second half of the 1990s, and more recently the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on all Types of Forests in December 2007 are only a few examples of such convergence.

TABLE 1 *Brazil and Indonesia at a glance*

| | Brazil | Indonesia |
|-------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| Population | 190 million ¹ | 235 million ¹ |
| Surface area (ha) | 851.2 million ha ¹ | 191.9 million ha ¹ |
| Forests | Percentage cover in 2005 | 56 % |
| | Forest cover lost between 1990 and 2005 (ha) | 42.4 million ha |
| | Forest cover lost between 1990 and 2005 (%) | 8.2 % |
| | | 46% |
| | | 28.1 million ha |
| | | 24.1% |

Source: FAO (2005)

¹ CIA Factbook: Brazil (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html#Geo>) and CIA Factbook: Indonesia (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>), retrieved 23 January 2008.

within the IFR paradoxically facilitates appropriation by actors at the domestic level.

Brazilian FRPs since the 1970s

Brazilian FRPs, especially Amazonian policies, have long been characterised by a notable absence of forestry issues *per se*. The military regime that had come to power in a coup in 1964 decided to focus on “unlocking” the wealth of Brazil’s vast interior as a means of national development. The “conquest” of the country’s hinterland had long defined Brazil’s construction as a state as teams of *bandeirantes* (prospectors and explorers) successfully pushed the border westwards between Portuguese and Spanish America in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, thus enabling Brazil to cover over half of the Amazon Basin.

In a bid to “occupy” this huge territory, President Juscelino Kubitschek oversaw the long-dreamed construction of Brasília and the first highway to cross the Brazilian Amazon (BR 010 between Belém and Brasília), both “completed” in 1961. The ensuing military regime (1964–1985) thus only pursued an already existing policy, but by taking it several steps further, it ensured that Brazil’s “Manifest Destiny” (Barbosa 2000) had never been more palpable.

Throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, a large number of “pharaonic works” (*obras faraônicas*) were carried out by the Federal Government with the help of the military (as a form of labour among other roles). In 1966 the Superintendence for the Development of the Amazon (SUDAM) was created to oversee a number of infrastructure programmes (Droulers 2004) such as *Operação Amazônia* (1966–70), *Projeto de Integração da Amazônia* or PIN (1970–4), *Poloamazônia* (1975–9) *Projeto Grande Carajás* (1974–84) and *Polonoroeste* (1981–5).

Each programme set out specific long-term objectives such as promoting national integration or solving the problem of landless peasants, yet two overarching and related goals may be identified in the military regime’s Amazonian policies – or at least in the government’s discourse. The first goal was to tap into the Amazon Basin’s supposed immense riches to fuel the country’s development and bring it within the circle of the world’s superpowers. The second was to reaffirm Brazil’s sovereignty over this vast territory against foreign

interests. These were both local (guerrilla movements were raging in neighbouring countries including Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Surinam) and global, such as the United States and Europe’s supposed plans to internationalise the Amazon to prevent Brazil from becoming a viable competitor on the international stage. *Integrar para não entregar* (“Integrate the Amazon or surrender it”) had almost become a motto for the Brazilian Amazon.

By the mid-1980s, however, a turning point had been reached. Following several years of political crisis and President Figueiredo’s promises for *abertura* (opening), the military government handed over power to a civilian government and the first free elections for over 20 years were held. This regime change, however, was only the result of an ongoing process of democratisation that lasted throughout the 1980s and which saw major changes in the country’s FRPs among others.

The rise of several social movements starting in the late 1970s is key to understanding the changes that the Amazon underwent during the following decade. With the help of a politically mobilised wing of the Catholic Church known as Liberation Theology, two Amazon-wide social movements appeared. First, the rubber tapper movement headed by Chico Mendes arrived on the political scene in the late 1970s by carrying out *empates* (“peaceful resistance meetings”) to prevent the allocation of the land they lived on to cattle ranches, notably in the state of Acre.

Secondly, Church representatives working with indigenous groups mobilised indigenous leaders and facilitated communication between groups across the region so as to establish a single indigenous political voice. Both movements shared many points in common, including demands for a recognition of access to the land they lived on and opposition to the government’s policies that were threatening their livelihoods. Building on these common points, Chico Mendes established the Alliance of Peoples of the Forest (*Aliança dos Povos da Floresta*) shortly before his assassination in 1988.

These movements pictured themselves as representatives of the rural poor oppressed by the dictatorship and businesses and thus found a sympathetic ear both abroad and among the country’s urbanised middle classes. This attracted two additional allies: (i) a rapidly developing

environmental movement (which had strong connections with foreign conservation NGOs), which led to a sometimes uneasy marriage (Singer 2007a) with social movements to preserve both the Amazon rainforest and its traditional and indigenous cultures; and (ii) the media both abroad and at home which from 1985 onwards enjoyed increased freedom of information and communication. Suddenly, pictures of Indian chiefs in full traditional gear demonstrating in front of the Brazilian Congress were beamed around the world, along with images of rampant deforestation and forest fires, thus mobilising world opinion on the fate of the Amazon Forest.

Foreign public opinion played a non-negligible role in tipping the balance in favour of major change in Brazil's FRPs. Until the mid-1980s, the World Bank had approved and in some cases contributed to financing the military government's works in the Amazon, including the construction of the Tucuruí Dam as part of the *Projeto Grande Carajás*. Yet in the face of the forced eviction of Parakanã Indians from the vicinity of Tucuruí, the World Bank decided to stop financing the project – a first in relations between the Bank and Brazil.

The Bank's new policy to take into account social and environmental consequences of such works was reaffirmed in 1987 when it demanded that the Waimiri-Atroari Indians be compensated for the loss of their territory due to the construction of the Balbina Dam in northern Amazonas (Singer 2007a). Kolk (1996) argues that this radical shift in World Bank policy was due to threats from the US Congress to cut funding to the Bank following domestic public concern about the fate of the Amazon and its indigenous peoples.

From the late 1980s onwards, federal FRPs were to focus on issues other than industry, agriculture and defence, and for the first time the issue of forests made their appearance in Amazonian policies. It must be pointed out that forests had been mentioned in Amazonian policies before 1985, such as when Jaú National Park was created in the 1970s, yet they remained marginal in politics and policies alike. With the turn in FRPs, however, forests and in particular forest conservation were to figure much higher in the political agenda.

President Fernando Collor set the tone by requesting that the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development be held on Brazilian soil in a bid to show his government's good will towards protecting the Amazon forest. That year, the Ministry of the Environment (*Ministério do Meio Ambiente* or MMA) was established, only three years after its executive branch, IBAMA, had been set up. The Rio Summit had major consequences on Brazil's FRPs, embodied in the creation of the G7 Pilot Project (PPG7) which channelled funding from international donors under the auspices of the MMA for conservation and sustainable development projects in Brazil's forests.

The 1990s thus witnessed major changes in the three main components of Brazilian FRPs. First, a whole range of

actors made their appearance during the period surrounding the Rio Summit, including many international conservation NGOs such as WWF and Friends of the Earth (*Amigos da Terra*) but also several Brazilian NGOs that have played key roles ever since, such as *Instituto Socio-Ambiental*, IPAM and IMAZON. Likewise, PPG7 officially enabled the entire international donor community to play a much larger role in FRPs than they had ever before, especially the World Bank, GTZ and the European Commission. Secondly, public government discourse changed radically and shifted from a focus on the Amazon as a source of development and a territory to be defended against outside interests, to a discourse that had already been adopted by NGOs and social movements that emphasised the rights of traditional peoples and the need to protect the Amazon forest.

Thirdly, policy instruments also shifted from large-scale constructions and colonisation schemes to one of "zoning" (*zonagem*) and in particular the creation and demarcation of protected areas – both conservation units and indigenous territories. The 1990s saw the greatest increase in the total surface of conservation units and indigenous territories the country had ever witnessed. This process culminated with the establishment of the National Conservation Unit System (SNUC) passed in 2000 in the law of the same name which recognised a wide range of different conservation units with specific purposes. It was also during this period – in 1996 to be precise – that the legal reserve⁴ for the Amazon was bumped up to 80% in what appears to be a knee-jerk reaction due to an international outcry following a peak in deforestation the previous year.

However, the transition to these new FRPs was not as smooth or as clear-cut as it might appear at first sight. As Kolk (1996) correctly points out, the three emerging movements (rubber tapper, indigenist and environmentalist) and the international public outcry at the fate of the Amazon was met with fierce nationalistic rhetoric throughout the second half of the 1980s. "*A Amazônia é nossa!*" (The Amazon is ours!): President José Sarney's words sum up the discourse which focused on denouncing the three social movements as agents of an international lobby bent on internationalising the Amazon. These arguments saw a recent revival in the 2000s as witnessed by the publication of a series of books attempting to label environmentalist and indigenist movements as American spies:

The environmental movement is not a spontaneous sociological phenomenon that arises out of growing awareness about the real needs to reconcile human activities with respect for the environment in which they are inserted. Instead, the movement is an ideological and political construction, specifically and carefully planned, created and maintained by powerful internationalist hegemonic groups with the aim of preventing the expansion of the profits made by the industrial-technological societies from reaching certain peoples and

⁴ The legal reserve is the percentage of surface area on private property that must retain forest cover.

parts of the world so as to keep the development process under their own control.⁵

Lino *et al.* (2005)

Likewise, the year the military regime came to an end, a secret programme known as *Calha Norte* was set up aimed at building infrastructure along the northern border with Colombia and Venezuela. Military territories seriously overlapped with protected areas and indigenous territories (Yanomami ones among others) in particular, which eventually led to the suspension of the programme in 1990 at a time when the demarcation of indigenous territories was in the international spotlight. Yet the programme was revived in 2000, although this time a much more civilian tone was given to the project which was aimed at “increasing border vigilance and protection of populations. As well as providing assistance to populations, the programme’s actions hope to fix humans in the Amazon region. The programme aims to set up development projects with are socially fair and ecologically sustainable” (Ministério da Defesa 2006).

Along with other initiatives such as President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s *Brasil em Ação* in the mid-1990s and despite the fact that conservation policies were the new order of the day, Brazil’s FRPs from the late 1980s to the early 2000s might appear somewhat schizophrenic. This could explain why observers have referred to Amazonian policies during those years in terms of vectors (Becker 2004) or forces (Aparecida de Mello 2002) opposing each other – hence President Inácio Lula da Silva’s attempts to conciliate apparently diverging goals by packaging a number of measures into “sustainable” programmes.

The most famous of these was the “Sustainable BR163” programme (*BR163 sustentável*) which responded to demands both from agricultural and environmental lobbies. At a time when soy exports were buoying the Brazilian economy, the Lula government accepted the agricultural lobby’s request to have the BR163 paved from Cuiabá to Santarém, which would facilitate access for Mato Grosso’s agricultural products to the Amazon River and thus the Pacific via the Panama Canal. However, aware of the potential negative impacts that the increased use of the BR163 would have on the environment, the government notably promised to create protected areas on both sides of the highway so as to minimise environmental degradation.

The 2000s have also seen an additional dimension appear in Brazilian FRPs, namely that of timber production. During the military regime, as before, the timber industry had never been the focus of Amazonian policies despite being one of the region’s most important sectors. In the late 1980s and 1990s, the image of the timber industry as a major factor of deforestation emphasised by environmental movements had

also prevented the government from implementing anything more than measures restricting logging activities. Such policies were pursued well into the 2000s as illustrated by *Operação Curupira* which dismantled a network of IBAMA staff involved in permit forgery as late as 2005, leaving the timber industry reeling as very few companies were given permits that year.

Yet at the same time, a debate was raging throughout the country on whether to introduce a concession system which would allow logging on public lands. Paradoxically, it was NGOs such as *Amigos da Terra* and IMAZON which had originally encouraged the idea, suggesting that concessions actually provide forests with economic value and ensure human presence whilst maintaining forest cover and preventing illegal appropriation of lands (*grilagem*). With the help of ex-NGO staff at the Ministry of the Environment, NGOs succeeded in mobilising virtually all actors in favour of this idea that became reality in 2006 with the law on Public Forests – which also saw the creation of the Brazilian Forestry Service (SFB), the first public organisation to deal specifically with the timber industry.

Indonesian FRPs since the 1970s

In stark contrast to Brazil, Indonesian FRPs have very much focused on timber production ever since Suharto came to power in 1965. Until then, FRPs in the Dutch East Indies and during the Soekarno era were mostly restricted to timber production in Java’s teak plantations whose management goes back to pre-colonial times (Peluso 1992, Durand 1994), the rest of the archipelago’s forests remaining mostly untouched.

The Soekarno era (1949-1965) saw little change in this status quo. However, at the risk of sounding simplistic, if Soekarno’s policies can be summed up in one word – nationalism – then his successor Suharto’s definitely focused on development instead. Following his sudden rise to power in 1965 in the midst of massacres and general confusion, Suharto depoliticised and imposed major restrictions on Indonesian society. He channelled his policies to embark the country on a long period of sustained economic growth fuelled by a small number of industries. By far the most profitable of these was the oil industry (De Koninck 2004), but timber production also played a major role.

It has been argued that the Indonesian state and the ruling elite during the New Order was primarily geared towards developing the country economically. Whilst figures certainly show that this was the case – at least in the 1970s and 1980s – this elite also focused on concentrating both economic and political power in the hands of a few individuals who were all members of Suharto’s close entourage (both family and

⁵ “O movimento ambientalista não é um fenômeno sociológico espontâneo, decorrente de uma conscientização sobre as necessidades reais de compatibilização das atividades humanas com certos requisitos de respeito ao meio ambiente no qual elas se inserem. Na verdade, trata-se de um engendro ideológico e político, específica e habilmente planejado, criado e mantido por poderosos grupos hegemônicos internacionalistas, com o propósito de conter a expansão dos benefícios das sociedade industrial-tecnológica a todos os povos e países do planeta e manter o processo de desenvolvimento sob o seu controle.”

friends), as suggested by Barr (1999). Close collaboration with the army in all sectors – which Suharto was successful in establishing through an early series of purges – was crucial in maintaining power (Ross 2001).

The forest sector was no exception. Starting in 1967 Suharto thus brought about fundamental changes to Indonesia's FRPs, each step bringing the timber industry under increasingly tighter control by the government and a small economic elite. With the Basic Forestry Law (*Undang-undang Pokok-pokok Kehutanan*) 5/1967 the concept of a state-owned forest estate that existed on Java was applied to the entire archipelago and a staggering 143 million hectares (three quarters of the country's surface area according to Ross (2001) became labelled as state Forest Estate (*kawasan hutan*), a large portion of which was earmarked for timber production (Barr 1998). As delineated in Government Regulation (*Peraturan Pemerintah*) 21/1970, production forests within the forest estate were divided into concessions (*Hak perusahaan hutan* or HPH) to be allocated to public or private timber companies by the Directorate General of Forestry in Jakarta.

Suharto immediately set about banning small-scale logging ventures, known as *banjir kap*, by revoking the authority of provincial governments to distribute small-scale concessions. In doing so, Suharto succeeded in concentrating the industry in the hands of fewer, larger businesses whilst allowing the sector to boom, as witnessed by the sharp increase in log exports during that decade:

[T]he recorded volume of log exports [between 1966 and 1973] rose from 334,000 m³ to 18.5 million m³. By 1973, Indonesia's logging industry generated US\$562 million, or 18% of the nation's total exchange earnings (...). Indonesia's log export levels and the revenues they produced reached new heights in the late 1970s. The reported volume of unprocessed timber shipped overseas exceeded 20 million m³ per year during 1976-1978, when Indonesia supplied 44% of world hardwood exports. Barr (2006)

As Barr (1999) points out, “the distribution of timber concessions to rent-seeking state elites played an especially significant role in solidifying Soeharto's own power base within the state apparatus by buying the allegiance of key functionaries”. By the late 1970s, however, Suharto declared his intention to end this system by banning log exports that were to be phased out between 1981 and 1985. As might be expected, log production fell dramatically in the late 1970s and early 1980s which saw a corresponding growth in exported plywood from 1.25 million m³ in 1982 (just under 30% of world tropical plywood exports) to 6.9 million m³ six years later (71%), peaking at 9 million m³ throughout the early 1990s (78%) (Barr 1999).

Durand (1994) explains this apparently paradoxical decision by suggesting that Suharto was bowing to external pressure to promote domestic industrial development. Yet Barr (1999) claims that “the New Order state's decision in the late 1970s / early 1980s to ban the export of raw logs was

anything but an apolitical move” and interprets this policy simply as a means of regaining control of the timber sector: “while the log export ban pushed scores of concession-holders out of business, it also proved to be tremendously profitable for a much smaller number of timber operators” (Barr 1999).

Throughout the rest of the New Order the timber industry was submitted to further control measures, including the creation of the Indonesian Wood Panel Producers Association (*Asosiasi Panel Kayu Indonesia* or Apkindo) in 1976. By the early 1980s, Apkindo had been vested with far-reaching powers over the sector, including controlling the overall volume and prices of Indonesian plywood as well as assigning firm-level export quotas to its members. It even went so far as to serve as an intermediary between sellers and buyers. The concentration of power was especially beneficial to one man, “Bob” Hasan, who enjoyed very close ties with Suharto and served as Chair of Apkindo's Board of Directors throughout the 1980s and 1990s – a position that turned out to be enormously profitable for him. Additional means of keeping control over the timber sector included (i) maintaining the state as the dominant source of capital investment (thanks to huge benefits generated from oil exports); (ii) forcing ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs – the backbone of the economy – to seek political protection by declaring populist anti-Chinese measures (e.g., banning the use of the Chinese language); and (iii) revoking timber licenses whenever deemed necessary (Dauvergne 2001).

The fall of Suharto in May 1998 following the 1997 Asian financial crisis brought about major changes in the timber sector. The state's tight control over the industry was dismantled, starting with the IMF's request for the cancellation of Apkindo's marketing restrictions by 1 February 1998 as part of structural reforms tagged to emergency bailout loans. A struggle ensued for the survival of Apkindo which was dissolved by Suharto's successor B.J. Habibie. Bob Hasan was later imprisoned and has since been released.

The post-Suharto era has also been characterised by the arrival of a range of new actors, including within the timber sector (Barr 1999). This was partly enabled by a number of laws on decentralisation which have marked the period following 1998 known as *Reformasi*. The New Order had left a legacy of bitterness towards Jakarta and the Javanese-dominated bureaucracy among provincial elites who were eager to increase their power again. Law 22/1999 set the tone by transferring considerable authority to autonomous regions and although a wide range of sectors were affected, analysts believe this law primarily targeted forest management.

The transfer of authority stipulated in the law was much more in favour of districts (*kabupaten*) and municipalities (*kecamatan*) than to provinces (*propinsi*), possibly in a bid to limit desire for independence observed at provincial level. Law 41/1999 on forestry was issued five months later but in many ways was contradictory to Law 22/1999 as it assigned very little authority to the country's regional governments (McCarthy *et al.* 2006). Likewise, Government Regulation 34/2002 aimed at implementing Law 41/1999 was widely seen as an effort to recentralise administrative authority in

the forest sector as it confirmed the Minister of Forestry's sole authority in issuing concessions, renamed "commercial timber utilisation permits" (*Izin usaha pemanfaatan hasil hutan kayu* or IUPHHK).

Yet a flurry of other decrees in 1999 and 2000 vested *bupatis* (heads of districts) with the authority to issue small-scale logging and forest conversion permits whose names and specificities differed according to the region (HPHH and IPPK in Kalimantan, IPKR in Jambi, etc.) and the decree (Ministerial Decree 05.1/Kpts-II/2000 referring to them as IPHHK) (Barr *et al.* 2006). However, they were eventually limited in scope by Government Regulation 34/2002 and have since been revoked. Such accumulation of legislative dissonance created considerable confusion throughout the 2000s that only contributed to mismanagement, deforestation and the exhaustion of the country's timber resources.

Back in the 1990s, the depletion of timber in concessions despite the compulsory application of scientific management rules (known as TPTI) started becoming glaringly obvious from the late 1990s and partially accounts for the sharp fall of HPHs/IUPHHKs in the past decade. This fall from 61.70 million hectares in the sector's heyday in 1993-4 to 27.72 million hectares in 2005 (Departemen Kehutanan 2006) epitomises the agony of the large-scale timber industry which has now all but disappeared except in East Kalimantan. Additional reasons have been put forward for this virtual freefall: (i) the phasing out of the army's *dwifungsi* (dual function) meant that disgruntled local populations have often successfully driven out timber companies from concessions; (ii) forest fires which have taken place every year since the late 1990s have further contributed to depletion as well as constituting a health and transport hazard known as the "haze"; and (iii) extensive media coverage and NGO campaigns (such as that of NGO Telapak's investigation in Papua in 2003) on illegal logging led to a clampdown on the logging industry nationwide which – according to industry representatives – have had a major negative impact on the entire sector including its legal part.

Probably the only form of logging currently on the increase is of community-based timber production. The movement towards involving local populations in forest management already has a long history on Java (Peluso 1992) and received a boost following the 1978 World Forestry congress held in Jakarta (San Afri Awang, personal communication). It was further strengthened on Java during the *Reformasi* era with the creation of a programme known as "Forest Management with the People" (*Pengelolaan Hutan Bersama Masyarakat* or PHBM) (Affianto *et al.* 2005), whilst recent debates to generalise and systematise community involvement to the whole country has been encouraged by Government Regulation 6/2007 which

promotes the creation of community-managed forests across the entire archipelago.

However, in contrast to Brazil, the indigenous dimension of this trend remains very discreet. In the wake of *Reformasi* a number of NGOs were created (*e.g.*, AMAN) to promote the rights of "indigenous peoples" of Indonesia for which the term *masyarakat adat* was used. Following the fall of Suharto and the demise of the army's role in social affairs, the issue of ethnicity reappeared as ethnic conflicts flared across the nation. The Transmigration (*Transmigrasi*) policy⁶ had been greatly developed under the New Order and put local populations on the Outer Islands in direct contact with Javanese, Balinese and Madurese immigrants mainly. Yet demands for official recognition of *adat* peoples have so far fallen on deaf ears among government circles (*e.g.*, World Agroforestry Centre *et al.* 2003). Transmigration has not only had a social impact but is also widely believed to have contributed to deforestation, notably on Sumatra and Kalimantan. In more recent years, "transmigrant" communities have been instrumental in the expansion of one of Indonesia's fastest-growing industries, the palm oil sector.

In the face of dwindling revenues from the timber sector and the depletion of timber in the country's concessions, the Ministry of Forestry has taken steps to promote the expansion of fast-growing plantations within the Forest Estate (such as acacia and eucalyptus), notably for the production of pulp and paper. In December 2006, the Ministry announced a target of establishing a total of 9 million hectares of plantations for industrial wood by 2016 as part of a "forestry revitalisation programme". This trend has been spearheaded by the province of Riau on the eastern coast of Sumatra, which is home to Indonesia's two greatest pulp and paper companies, RAPP (also known as APRIL) and APP. Both companies have greatly benefited from conversion of natural forest timber concessions (HPH) with depleted standing stocks of commercially valuable timber to plantation concessions (HTI) (Singer 2007b).

The palm oil sector – which recently received a boost after having been recognised as a biofuel – has also greatly benefited from the land freed up by the demise of the timber sector. Despite the fact that – unlike "fastwood" plantations – oil palm plantations are not allowed inside the Forest Estate, the industry has found several ways to overcome this particular hurdle to its expansion. First, it took advantage of the short period of time in the early 2000s when *bupatis* were allowed to grant conversion areas (*Areal penggunaan lain* or APL) within the Forest Estate, thus reducing the latter's surface area. Secondly, in Riau for example, it is believed that local officials have encouraged "transmigrant" populations to settle inside the Forest Estate and cultivate oil palm.

⁶ Transmigration was actually initiated by the Dutch at the turn of the 20th century under the name *Kolonisatie* but its scope was greatly expanded by the New Order during which an estimated 5.5 million people from Java, Madura and Bali settled in the "Outer Islands", especially Sumatra and Kalimantan. To this figure certain analysts (*e.g.*, De Koninck 2004:153) have added another 5.5 million of spontaneous immigrants (*pendatang spontan*), most of whom were following family members who had moved with the official transmigration programme. The Transmigration programme officially came to an end in 2000.

As a result, although Indonesia comes second after Brazil in the total area lost to deforestation (see Table 1), it outranks it in percentage terms, having lost a staggering 24.1% between 1990 and 2005 alone according to FAO figures. Yet the plight of Indonesian forests does not appear to have captured as much attention as the Brazilian Amazon in international debates, possibly as a consequence of a more limited civil society. After a number of international NGOs such as WWF had gradually increased their presence in the archipelago, the period of *Reformasi* witnessed an explosion in the number of local environmental NGOs, much like that of Brazil in the late 1980s. However, access to information often remains difficult and the capacity of NGOs to push for reform sometimes limited.

This might also explain why forest conservation policies have undergone little change in recent decades, especially when compared to the Brazilian Amazon. Following the 1978 World Forestry Congress held in Jakarta, the government admittedly expanded the country's protected area network from 3.3 to 18.7 million hectares, yet this growth mainly took place at the expense of "protected forests" (*hutan lindung*) where logging is not allowed. More recently, Wiryono (2003) notes the lack of clarity between different types of protected areas and the failure to have a clear classification system such as in Brazil. As this author points out, despite a recent expansion in numbers, protected areas continue to face the same threats as several decades ago, notably agricultural encroachment and illegal logging.

TABLE 2 The evolution of Brazilian FRPs since the 1970s according to policy discourses, instruments and networks. Only the main discourses, instruments and networks are described and dates provided cover their presence high on the political agenda. This table does not illustrate the diversity within each of the elements mentioned.

| Discourse | Instruments | Networks |
|--|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Classic" Nationalism (1960s to 1980s) The Amazon has to be developed and "occupied" to (i) help Brazil developed country status and (ii) protect the Amazon against foreign intruders (<i>Integrar para não entregar, A Amazônia é nossa</i>) • "Green Mafia" Nationalism (since 1990s) The Amazon needs to be occupied to protect it against foreigners (especially developed countries) and their allies, notably indigenist and environmentalist movements (<i>e.g., Máfia Verde</i>) • Pro-poor conservation (since 1980s) Traditional and indigenous populations need to be made stewards of the forest to protect it against oppressive forces such as the government and the agricultural lobby. Further construction of infrastructure and colonisation must be halted and protected areas expanded. • Sustainable development (since 2000s) An attempt to conciliate infrastructure development and economic activities with social and environmental priorities. Economic activities need not be harmful to the environment if packaged with social and environmental mitigation programmes (<i>e.g.</i> "Sustainable BR163 programme", introduction of timber concessions). Some of these activities (<i>e.g.</i> logging) may actually contribute to maintaining forest cover. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large-scale public/private works (1970s & 1980s) Public construction of large-scale infrastructure, <i>e.g.</i>, road-building (BR010, BR163, BR319, BR364, etc.) and dam-building (Tucuruí, Balbina) and private investments in other projects (<i>e.g.</i>, Projeto Jari, Projeto Carajás) as a means of "developing" the Amazon and promoting economic activities • Colonisation (1970s to 1990s) Encouraging immigration to solve the landless peasant issue (Agrarian reform) and "occupy" the Amazon. Both public (through INCRA) and private colonisation schemes • Protected areas and zoning (since late 1980s) Geographical restriction of economic activities and use of natural resources (as well as recognising access to land of certain social categories) through the creation of protected areas (conservation units and indigenous territories) and more widely through zoning plans (<i>e.g.</i>, SNUC, <i>zonagem</i>) • "Sustainable" projects (since 2000s) Building infrastructure and/or encouraging economic activities packaged with social and environmental mitigations measures (<i>e.g.</i>, "Sustainable BR163 programme", introduction of timber concessions through the 2006 law on Public Forests, state governments promoting FSC certification) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military network (1964-1985) The military federal government and its network of nominated state governments and governors, along with SUDAM as the executive organisation and the army as labour. This network survives to this day through the <i>Comando da Amazônia</i> battalion but has been largely depoliticised • Agricultural lobby (since 1980s) Political representatives elected along the "deforestation front" (states of Pará, Mato Grosso, Rondônia and Acre) at municipal, state and federal levels; some state governments such as Mato Grosso (Blairo Maggi's government); private sector federations (<i>e.g.</i>, FAMATO in Mato Grosso); an agricultural lobby of over 100 Congressmen in Brasília; and the Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) • "Forest Peoples' Alliance" (since late 1980s) Loose network of indigenist, community-based and environmental NGOs, indigenous and rubber tapper leaders and organisations, the Catholic Church (until 1990s), some state governments (<i>e.g.</i>, Acre), the Ministry of the Environment (MMA), and the international donor community (notably international NGOs and bilateral governmental donors such as GTZ) as the main providers of the network's financial resources |

TABLE 3 *The evolution of Indonesian FRPs since the 1970s according to policy discourses, instruments and networks. Only the main discourses, instruments and networks are described and dates provided cover their presence high on the political agenda. This table does not illustrate the diversity within each of the elements mentioned.*

| Discourse | Instruments | Networks |
|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forests for development (1960s to 1998) The state and timber companies as the legitimate stewards of Indonesia's forests. By logging forests according to scientific methods (TPTI), the state and the timber sector – through the concession system (HPH) – manage forests in the interests of the nation whilst providing one of the backbones of the country's economy (timber exports). • Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme (since 1998) A reaction to the "Forests for Development" discourse: the state and Suharto's cronies colluded to control the country's timber industry. What remains of corruption in forest management must be fought and transparency, accountability and good governance encouraged • Forests for local communities (since 1998) A second reaction to the "Forests for Development" discourse: local and <i>adat</i> communities must be empowered and their rights to their land recognised. By legitimising rural populations forests will be managed sustainably and deforestation reduced • Forest Conservation (since 1978) A "minority" discourse that was promoted following the 1978 World Forestry Congress in Jakarta and which has been maintained ever since (e.g., Suharto's proclamation of 1993 as the "year of the Environment"): Indonesia's protected area network must be expanded and guarded as one of the nation's natural assets. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Controlling the Timber Sector (1970s to 1998) Introduction of different legal instruments to increase state control over the timber sector: Basic Forestry Law (1967), HPHs (1970), banning of <i>banjir kap</i> companies (1970), log export ban (1985), timber license revocations (1990s) • Decentralisation and Recentralisation (1999-2004) Laws transferring powers and revenues to district level in particular (22/1999, 25/1999) and eventually back to the Ministry of Forestry (41/1999, 34/2002, 32/2004). The introduction and subsequent revocation of "mini-concessions" distributed by heads of districts (<i>bupati</i>) epitomises these policies • Community Forestry (since 1998) Wide range of initiatives to involve local populations in forest management; has taken place on a piecemeal basis with mitigated results, arguably the most successful being on Java (PHBM). The introduction into law of community-based forest management in Government Regulation 6/2007 might ensure success in the years to come • Protected areas and zoning (since 1978) The geographical restriction of economic activities through the expansion of protected areas has neither been successful (encroachment continues unabated) nor is it placed high on agendas. Periods of protected area expansion include 1978 (World Forestry Congress) and the <i>Reformasi</i> era with the appearance of new NGOs. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Bob Hasan" Network (1970s to 1998) A network of individuals close to Suharto who tightened their control on Indonesia's timber sector through a series of legal instruments. At the heart of this network was Suharto, the Ministry of Forestry and Apkindo, headed by Mohammed "Bob" Hasan. Apkindo was dismantled in 1998. • Environmentalist-Indigenist Network (since 1998) Loose network of local, national and international environmental NGOs as well as <i>adat</i> leaders and national and international indigenist NGOs. The number of NGOs increased exponentially during the <i>Reformasi</i> era and retains a strong student component, hence proximity with some universities. Much funding is also provided by the international donor community. Other than for donors this network remains almost exclusively non-governmental, especially on the <i>adat</i> issue as the state does not recognise the existence of "indigenous" communities. • "Fastwood Plantation" Network (since late 1990s) Once under tight control during the New Order as a means of pressuring the press, the pulp and paper sector has boomed in recent years and is almost exclusively in the hands of two companies based in Riau (APP & RAPP/APRIL). The Ministry of Forestry has sought a <i>rapprochement</i>, has focused on this sector and encouraged its expansion politically as part of a country-wide "forestry revitalisation" policy. |

APPROPRIATING THE IFR

This brief description of Brazilian and Indonesian FRPs shows the extent to which the national political context outweighs the international forests regime in shaping national forest-related policies. FRPs appear to be dominated by one or two national policy networks which are instrumental both in maintaining dominant discourses and introducing policy instruments that legitimise their role in forest management issues.

This is not to say that the influence of the international forests regime (IFR) on Brazilian and Indonesian FRPs has remained negligible – on the contrary. Tables 2 and 3 show that the actors, forums and principles that make up the IFR are found peppered across the three components (networks, discourses, instruments) of FRPs: (i) the presence of international NGOs and the donor community; (ii) certain instruments such as protected areas; and (iii) specific discourses such as the conservation, pro-poor and community-

oriented ones are only a few examples. Yet inputs from the IFR also visibly differ both in time (according to the period covered) and in space (according to the country affected). In fact, two main patterns are discernable in the way the IFR has influenced FRPs.

Quantitative Variations in the IFR's Influence

First, the IFR's influence varies visibly in *quantity*, especially when comparing different moments in time. In Brazil, the military regime saw very little input from the outside, with the notable exception of foreign investments (*e.g.* from the World Bank) – although only to fund projects set up by the Brazilian government itself. In contrast, the period since 1985 has seen much greater international influence than during the military regime. This input – doubtlessly facilitated by sudden freedom of expression – enabled many international organisations to get involved in Brazil and ultimately contributed to the organisation of the Summit on Environment and Development in Rio.

One could argue that the IFR is unlikely to have influenced Brazilian FRPs prior to 1985 because it only came into being in the second half of the decade. To a large extent, this holds true, despite the fact that the origins of the IFR can be traced back to the 1970s. Yet although it was well underway by the late 1990s, the IFR only began significantly affecting Indonesian FRPs after Suharto's fall in 1998. During Indonesia's New Order, the IFR's influence remained marginal: several international donors funded forest sector projects which nevertheless had a minimal political dimension and were mainly restricted to the technical sphere.

In 1998, however, the “Bob Hasan” network was dismantled and the following period was marked by a strengthening of the presence of international NGOs and donors alike. Several donors even opened offices inside the Ministry of Forestry, such as DFID and the European Commission. Principles in discussion at the time within the IFR were also introduced in Indonesian FRPs, notably (i) “good governance” which took the form of the FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade) process, and (ii) to a lesser extent participation, implemented mainly on Java with the introduction of PHBM.

A comparison of the countries thus shows that it was during periods immediately following regime change (1985-1992 for Brazil, 1998-2004 for Indonesia) that the IFR was able to influence national FRPs in a more significant way. The power vacuum caused by the downfall of long-standing political regimes and the economic crises that triggered them (at least partly) thus acted as windows of opportunity for networks of actors belonging to the IFR to introduce their own actors and principles.

However, one cannot extrapolate from this comparison that democratic regimes are more amenable to the IFR than dictatorial ones. The difference between both types of regimes and their effects on the IFR's influence might appear to be clear-cut in Brazil and Indonesia. Yet this conclusion does not necessarily stand once the comparison is extended

to some Central African countries where the divide between democracy and dictatorship is more blurred and the growing influence of the IFR in the sub-region cannot be accounted for by any sudden regime change. Instead, the balance of power between policy networks might be a more solid indicator of the IFR's influence. In Brazil and Indonesia, it was only once the military and Apkindo networks were dismantled that other policy networks were able to bring about change inspired by the IFR. This also holds true for Central African countries such as Cameroon where the Biya regime was severely weakened in the early 1990s by deep economic recession and public unrest. This acted as a window of opportunity for the international donor community – spearheaded by the World Bank – to bring about sweeping reforms in the forest sector, epitomised by the 1994 forestry law, even in the absence of any regime change.

Qualitative Variations in the IFR's Influence

Secondly, a comparison between the IFR's input in Brazilian and Indonesian FRPs shows that the IFR's influence also varies in *quality*. As described above, the IFR's influence has been felt in a much stronger way in Brazil since 1985 and in Indonesia since 1998, but when comparing both countries, the type of influence has been very different. Admittedly, the IFR's input in terms of international actors present in national networks varies little – the same set of international organisations or “donor community” (UN organisations, International Financial Institutions, bilateral donors, large NGOs) are found in both countries. However, the weight of different principles developed within the IFR differs strongly according to (i) prominent ideas, and (ii) specific interests within dominant domestic policy networks.

First, existing ideas and interests upheld by domestic opponents to the regime prior to its downfall appear to have determined which of the main principles vehicled by the IFR was to figure highest within FRPs following regime change. In Brazil the issue of conservation *sensu lato* (*i.e.*, with the recognition of local people's rights) has been developed to a much greater extent than in Indonesia; as Pádua (1996) points out, Brazil never focused on protected areas that excluded human presence (“integral reserves”) but instead gave priority to areas in which the use of natural resources is restricted but which recognises the rights of particular groups of individuals, in particular indigenous groups (in indigenous territories) and rubber tapper communities (in extractive reserves or RESEX). The second half of the 1980s and the 1990s are indeed marked by the considerable expansion of both the total surface area protected in the Amazon and the number of categories of protected areas. The “SNUC” law in 2000 marked a milestone, but the protected area networks has never ceased expanding since.

In Indonesia, debates linked to the IFR have focused instead on the issue of good governance and by extension the fight against both corruption and “illegal logging”. The decentralisation laws of 1999 were primarily called for by all the regional actors whose power had been reduced by an ever increasingly centralised political system. In such a

context, measures to devolve power to regional authorities was a way of serving the interests of local actors, many of whom were to be known as *raja-raja kecil* (little kings). Yet it was also strongly supported by international organisations as a means of taking power out of the hands of what was perceived as a corrupt elite. International organisations funded several investigations into the corruption of the New Order (e.g. Brown 1999 sponsored by DFID), further fuelling the outcry and more widely the anti-New Order *Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme* or KKN discourse that marked the *Reformasi* generation.

By the early 2000s, the focus on good governance turned towards “illegal logging” and at the request of the donor community the FLEGT process was established. The issue was placed high on the political agenda in the first half of the decade – at least in discourse – both by the media which denounced illicit timber production all over the archipelago, and by investigations by CIFOR researchers (e.g. Casson and Obidzinski 2002, McCarthy 2000, Obidzinski 2005, Obidzinski and Suramenggala 2000, Smith *et al.* 2003) and NGOs. The investigation that probably had the greatest impact on policies was that of local NGO Telapak in collaboration with British NGO EIA which produced a documentary uncovering a vast network of illegal logging in Papua. The months that followed this denunciation saw a major clampdown on Papuan forest services. As shown by recent events in Riau, even pulp and paper companies have not managed to avoid similar waves of police investigations.

It must be pointed out that good governance has also been promoted in Brazil (as witnessed by *Operação Curupira*, for instance) and conservation and indigenous issues in Indonesia (as illustrated by the revival of *adat* and the rise of an “indigenous” movement). These concepts and many others have featured on both countries’ political agenda; it is the *priority* given to these principles that has differed and which is emphasised here.

The recent debate in Brazil leading up to the adoption of the 2006 law on Public Forests is also a good example of how FRPs integrate potential influences from the IFR according to the dominant policy network. Throughout the first half of the 2000s, the idea of introducing a concession system to public forests in the Brazilian Amazon gained momentum within political circles related to NGO networks and the Ministry of the Environment (MMA). The rationale behind the introduction of concessions was in line with the “sustainable forest management” principle from the IFR which suggests that selective, sustainable logging can actually contribute to reducing deforestation as it provides economic value to existing forests. “Successful” examples of concessions such as Costa Rica were often brought up, whilst other more mitigated experiences such as Indonesia were hardly ever mentioned.

Yet a minority group of NGOs voiced their discontent at such a measure throughout the debate, evoking the “participation” principle – which also originated from the IFR. According to the NGO IPAM, for example, concessions were not a viable form of forest management as they did not take the concerns of local populations into

account. Ultimately, however, the dominant policy network succeeded in rallying sufficient momentum to pass the law, thus determining which element of the IFR was to have the last say in shaping Brazilian FRPs.

In both countries studied, it thus appears that certain elements of the IFR were given particular political attention in accordance with existing ideas and interests. These elements actually correspond to the demands of the dominant policy networks at the time: (i) the “Forest Peoples’ Alliance” in 1980s Brazil and the request for protection of the Amazon with the recognition of local peoples’ rights; (ii) the loose network of NGOs and regional actors in Indonesia who demanded an end to the corruption and excessive centralisation that plagued the New Order regime; and (iii) the dominant NGO network and the Ministry of the Environment in Brazil which successfully introduced the 2006 law on Public Forests. The evidence provided here strongly suggests, therefore, that dominant policy networks have played a crucial role in *appropriating* specific elements of the IFR and deciding which ones would be introduced into the national sphere.

In fact, the lack of cohesion within the IFR is likely to have only further contributed to this phenomenon of appropriation. The array of different actors and principles and the lack of a single voice within the IFR have only made it easier for domestic policy networks to use elements of the IFR in a “pick-and-mix” fashion. In some instances such as in the debate leading to the introduction of the concession system in Brazil, actors even used contradictions inherent to the IFR (e.g., participation versus sustainable forest management) to play different elements of the IFR against each other.

WHEN FRPS INFLUENCE THE IFR

Some might claim, however, that it was the timing of the fall of the long-standing Brazilian and Indonesian regimes that determined which principles from the IFR would shape national FRPs. It is true that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, conservation and participation were particularly in vogue in international debates linked to the IFR, just like “good governance” issues were in the late 1990s. Yet this argument leads us to questioning a chicken-and-egg situation: should the timing of the conservation/participation and good governance principles be imputed to the IFR or to the demise of the Brazilian military regime and the end of the Indonesian New Order respectively? In other words, it is possible that national FRPs influenced the IFR rather than vice-versa. The fall of long-standing political regimes may have opened windows of opportunity for the IFR to influence domestic FRPs, but in return, it is likely that the Brazilian and Indonesian cases – particularly in such critical moments – contributed to shaping international debates and placing certain principles on the agenda.

The Brazilian input into the emerging IFR up to 1992 is fairly clear. Regime change in Brazil (along with the associated rise of social movements) happened to coincide

with the increase in attention that NGOs, the media and governments of developed countries paid towards environmental issues. As a result, the plight of the Brazilian Amazon which was suddenly revealed to the world thanks to the loosening of governmental control over domestic media doubtlessly fed the debate on deforestation and contributed to shaping it in specific ways. In 1987, the first figures on deforestation in the Amazon (now known to have been a gross overestimation) were released whilst Chico Mendes received both a “Global 500” award from the United Nations and another one from the Better World Society. Both awards as well as the Amazon’s deforestation figures received ample international media coverage. The same year, *Our Common Future*, also known as the Brundtland Report, was released, suggesting that environmental conservation could go hand in hand with economic development, thus popularising the term “sustainable development”. It was also in this key year that the World Bank decided to stop funding the construction of the Tucuruí Dam (Kolk 1996) because of environmental concerns.

Until then, the principle of conservation had dominated the international debate on forests and focused primarily on protecting the natural environment, often regardless of the welfare of local populations or economic operators. This principle, however, remained relatively unpopular in Brazil where actors had envisaged instead an alliance between environmental and social movements, embodied in Chico Mendes’ “Alliance of the Peoples of the Forest”. Although this “marriage” was to prove shaky in the years to come, the focus of the emerging IFR most probably steered debates away from a “fortress conservation” to a “community-based conservation” perspective. The door was open to conciliating environmental protection with human needs, and it is probably no coincidence that the World Summit on Environment and Development was ultimately held in Rio.

The idea that development could be conciliated with the environment was not a new one; in fact, the World Commission on Environment and Development which was to write up the Brundtland Report was created in 1983. However, this idea was only one among many in the emerging debate on forests. It was the coming together of events in a timely fashion in the Brazilian Amazon, as well as the publication of a major international report drawing similar conclusions, that is likely to have enabled the principles of community-based conservation, participation and ultimately sustainable development to dominate the IFR for the years to come. During this particular window of opportunity opened by the change of regime in Brazil, therefore, domestic FRPs were able to provide significant input into the IFR through a series of key actors which acted as “go-betweens” (notably Chico Mendes, the World Bank, a handful of NGOs and the media).

Although the link between the fall of the New Order in Indonesia and the arrival of the principle of good governance in the IFR is somewhat more tenuous, a case can still be made suggesting that once again domestic FRPs contributed to shaping the IFR. The last few years of Suharto’s presidency had been marked by a slowing down of the Indonesian

economy that had witnessed a boom throughout the New Order. Although the regime had been plagued by corruption allegations since the 1960s, the blame of the looming economic crisis was increasingly placed on corruption within Suharto’s inner circle of cronies by the growing opposition. However, it was only with the Asian crisis in 1997 that Suharto’s regime was seriously threatened by a coalition of opponents who pointed the finger at the regime’s inefficiency, and the three words *Kolusi*, *Korupsi*, *Nepotisme* (or “KKN discourse”) became the order of the day.

Corruption was believed to be rife in all sectors of the economy, but the forest sector took the brunt of the accusations – not only because it had been a pillar of the Indonesian economy, but also because Suharto’s circle had been closely involved. Finally, the sector was beginning to show signs of exhaustion well before the 1997 crisis and signs of collusion at all levels of the sector – from the field to key positions in Apkindo and the Ministry – were visible for all to see. In the couple of years following Suharto’s resignation accusations only gained pace, rapidly reaching the international level, as witnessed by the IMF’s conditions in the forest sector as part of the structural reforms attached to its 1998 loans. Several researchers and donor organisations also rapidly focused on the issue of corruption and illegality, such as Christopher Barr (CIFOR) and David Brown (DFID) (see Barr [1998, 1999] and Brown [1999]). In the following years, illegal logging emerged as one of the most discussed issues in forestry circles in Indonesia, ranking among top priorities for donors, NGOs and researchers alike.

It was also in the late 1990s that “illegal logging”, “forest crime” and governance became major debating issues within the IFR. According to key witnesses, the issue of “good governance” had existed among donor circles throughout the 1990s following the end of the Cold War, but it was only towards the end of the decade that some actors within the IFR reached out to this concept to apply it to the forest sector in a bid to place the sector within a wider political agenda. As McAlpine (2003) points out, the term “illegal logging” first appeared in international negotiations in 1996 (UN IPF E/CN.117/1996/24 Para 16 and Para 31), and again in the G8’s Action Programme on Forests in 1998. At the local level, Global Witness had been working in Southeast Asia since 1995, but it was only in December 1999 that it signed a contract with the World Bank and DFID to act as an “independent observer” in Cambodia. At the same time, DFID focused on revenue loss in the Indonesian forest sector following publications such as Brown (1999) and the realisation by the Ministry of Finance of the income foregone due to alleged corruption within the sector.

By 2001, donors spearheaded by the US Department of State, DFID and the World Bank (Auer *et al.* 2006) had come together to convene on a process known as Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) in East Asia which came together in Bali on the (ill-fated) date of 11 September. This meeting had the effect of hoisting illegal logging to the top handful of priorities discussed in the IFR, following which an AFLEG process was set up for Central Africa and good governance, fighting corruption and transparency all

became key buzzwords within the donor community. Whilst it remains difficult to pinpoint precise events during which the case of Indonesia could have steered debates within the IFR towards good governance, it is obvious that the linkage between this long-standing issue and the forest sector emerged from an East Asian context in which the fall of Suharto and the KKN discourse are very likely to have played a key role. Again, whilst the principle of good governance already existed prior to regime change in Indonesia, the two came together in a timely fashion to change the course of the IFR.

CONCLUSION

In this light, the question of the effectiveness of the IFR in shaping FRPs appears to be much more complex than anticipated. First, the IFR has to contend with other factors that appear to have a greater influence on FRPs, especially the national political context which probably constitutes the single strongest factor of change in FRPs. It is obvious that the IFR's impact ultimately depends on a number of elements of national political contexts, notably (i) the political regime in place, and (ii) the dominant policy networks that are key in deciding how the IFR is appropriated. Secondly, actors in the IFR should expect to find that the relationship between FRPs and the IFR is not necessarily one-way; in fact, Brazilian and Indonesian FRPs are both likely to have provided their input into the IFR at critical moments of their history, helping to steer debates within the IFR on a new course. The evidence goes against the vision of a top-down relationship between the IFR and FRPs, thus suggesting that this relationship cannot be used as a convincing indicator of the IFR's effectiveness.

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