

Evidence-based Conservation

Lessons from the Lower Mekong

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24 Getting REDD to work in the Lower Mekong

Lessons learned from integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs)¹

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Integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) have been one of the most pervasive paradigms for conservation in the tropics over the last twenty years (McShane and Wells, 2004). In recent years, however, the international conservation discourse has moved away from project-based conservation approaches such as ICDP and Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). As part of this institutional shift, Payments for Environmental Services (PES) initiatives and REDD (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) have become the focus of international conservation discussions. It is widely anticipated that a global REDD framework, based on the concept of PES, will incorporate tropical forest conservation and management into the next global climate change agreement (UNFCCC, 2007; Angelsen and Atmadja, 2008; UNFCCC, 2009; Ghazoul *et al.*, 2010). Despite a current focus on international negotiations, the implementation of REDD will still require sub-national or project-scale interventions (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008). However, little attention has been focused on how REDD projects will be implemented at this scale. Many of the REDD projects proposed or pilot projects implemented so far resemble ICDPs, regardless of the fact that the term ICDP is rarely explicitly mentioned (Collins, 2008; IBRD, 2008; TNC, 2009). This suggests that the lessons from previous project-level conservation attempts, particularly lessons accumulated by ICDPs, will be an essential tool for designing effective, efficient and equitable REDD projects.

It is the intention of this chapter to:

- 1 demonstrate that REDD implementers have much to learn from the past successes and failures of ICDPs;
- 2 identify best practices for ICDP project implementation based on a review of the literature, and project implementation strategies in the Lower Mekong;
- 3 provide suggestions for the optimal design and implementation of REDD projects based on these best practices for ICDPs.

Brief History of ICDPs

ICDPs are typically defined as conservation projects that include rural development components (Sanjayan *et al.*, 1997; Wells *et al.*, 1999; Hughes and Flintan, 2001). This suite of conservation projects originally sought to combine goals for development and conservation within the framework of individual projects as a means for implementing the goals of sustainable development (McShane and Wells, 2004). The original rationale behind the development of ICDPs was a purported link between poverty and loss of tropical biodiversity and forest cover (Robinson and Redford, 2004). Proponents of ICDPs presumed that providing rural communities with alternative livelihoods and reducing poverty would lead to effective conservation (Sanjayan *et al.*, 1997). It was also often assumed that poverty alleviation and development schemes would act as just compensation for restricted forest access, thereby increasing community receptiveness to conservation (Abbot *et al.*, 2001). However, the link between poverty and conservation has proven to be highly speculative and somewhat elusive (Adams *et al.*, 2004; Roe, 2008; Leader-Williams *et al.*, 2010).

Many critics suggest that ICDPs have demonstrated a poor track record (Wells, 2003; McShane and Wells, 2004; Leader-Williams *et al.*, 2010). This has led many to question the underlying assumptions behind their design and implementation (McShane and Newby, 2004). Some researchers have called for a complete abandonment of ICDPs and the application of alternative approaches, such as community-led conservation, payments for ecosystem service (PES) or protected areas reliant on strong enforcement of local regulations, a “back to the barriers” approach (Terborgh, 2000; Wells, 2003; Horwich and Lyon, 2007; Engel *et al.*, 2008).

Despite long recorded criticism, ICDPs continue to be a highly pervasive tool for conservation practice throughout the tropics, whether projects are explicitly labelled as ICDPs or not (Wells *et al.*, 2004). Many conservationists continue to favour ICDPs over other conservation frameworks, particularly fortress or barrier-style conservation that ignores the needs and resource rights of local communities (Romero and Andrade, 2004; Hutton *et al.*, 2005). Furthermore, a number of publications suggest that the relative success of the ICDP approach may be dependent on the way in which projects are designed and implemented, as well as on the contexts in which they are placed (Sanjayan *et al.*, 1997; Robinson and Redford, 2004; Fisher *et al.*, 2005; Garnett *et al.*, 2007). Regardless of their outcomes, ICDPs provide an extremely useful set of lessons for how to, as well as how not to implement project-level tropical conservation.

Brief background on REDD and PES

Tropical deforestation is widely cited to account for 18 per cent of annual global greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2007). Despite its global importance, Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) is not included

in the currently active global climate change agreement, the Kyoto Protocol. However, the focus on REDD has greatly increased in recent years since the 13th Conference of Parties (COP-13) in 2007, when the Bali Action Plan outlined a path forward for REDD (UNFCCC, 2007). Further discussions suggested that REDD will be performance-based and that carbon emission accounting will be conducted at the national level with sub-national implementation (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008; Angelsen *et al.*, 2008). More recent negotiations, agreed upon at the Conference of Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen in December 2009, also suggest that REDD will include multiple benefits such as biodiversity conservation and reforestation, as well as economic and social benefits under the broader REDD+ agreement (UNFCCC, 2009; Miles and Dickson, 2010; Ghazoul *et al.*, 2010). However, some scepticism has been expressed that REDD+ can provide such bundled benefits that may be in conflict, and thus biodiversity and social safeguards need to be in place for REDD+ to be truly effective and equitable (Pistorius *et al.*, 2010).

The REDD concept emerged out of experience with payments for environmental services (PES) initiatives, which are voluntary transactions wherein environmental service buyers compensate environmental service providers (Wunder, 2005; Petheram and Campbell, Chapter 22 of this volume). Services can include watershed protection, carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation. True PES must also have a payment system that is conditional on the actual provision of the environmental service (Wunder, 2005; Pham, Chapter 23 of this volume). In the case of REDD, the environmental service provided is the reduction of carbon emissions from forests. However, REDD differs from true PES in that REDD will likely include official development assistance (ODA) that might not be conditional on the provision of carbon emission reductions (Dutschke *et al.*, 2008; UNFCCC, 2009). Despite the PES origins of REDD at the international and national scale, many of the initial examples of sub-national pilot projects closely resemble the ICDP conservation approach in rhetoric and implementation (Collins, 2008; IBRD, 2008; TNC, 2009).

Issues of REDD and PES equity, and the relevance of ICDPs

Equitability in the benefit sharing of REDD has implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of the REDD strategy as a whole (Table 24.1). Some observers also argue that there is a moral obligation of the global community to design REDD in a way that is equitable for poor, forest-dwelling communities (Brown *et al.*, 2008; Peskett *et al.*, 2008; Mukerjee, 2009; Pistorius *et al.*, 2010). Mitigation of climate change is being undertaken to prevent environmental impacts that most significantly affect poor people, such as crop failures, floods and droughts. Therefore, global mitigation strategies such as REDD should be designed to prevent negative impacts on poor people as well (Miles and Dickson, 2010). To this end, parameters for assessing the equitability, as well as the effectiveness and efficiency, of REDD projects could be put in place (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008), accompanied by biodiversity and

Table 24.1 Impacts on the three criteria for REDD of a failure of each of these criteria

<i>Three sets of criteria for successful REDD</i>		
<i>Effectiveness</i>	<i>Efficiency</i>	<i>Equitability</i>
Outcomes of criteria failures on other criteria		
Ineffective		
—	Funding will stop flowing into the REDD project	Forest communities will continue to receive inadequate compensation for the benefits of forest conservation and sustainable management
Inefficient		
Not enough funds will reach the ground to incentivize REDD activities	—	Forest communities will continue to receive inadequate compensation for the benefits of forest conservation and sustainable management
<i>Inequitable</i>		
Communities may disrupt REDD activities through the use of fire, illegal extraction, etc.	Increased funding may be required to protect REDD sites from communities that have been inadequately compensated	—

Source: Adapted from Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff (2008).

social safeguards (Pistorius *et al.*, 2010). However, accurate assessments require long-term monitoring that may be too slow and/or labour intensive to prevent early project failures. Therefore, emphasis should be placed on designing equitable, effective and efficient projects in the first instance (Pistorius *et al.*, 2010).

Many forest-dwelling and/or indigenous communities are highly sceptical of REDD for its potential to restrict access and extraction rights to their land (IFIPCC, 2007; Mukerjee, 2009). Many of these communities are highly reliant on forest access for their livelihoods (Shepherd, 2004). Therefore, restrictions placed on community access to forest for the sake of carbon conservation have highly significant livelihood and cultural implications (Mukerjee, 2009; Pistorius *et al.*, 2010). On the other hand, REDD has the potential to provide significant benefits to these same communities by providing new and supplementary environmental service incomes (Luttrell *et al.*, 2007; Brown *et al.*, 2008; Peskett *et al.*, 2008) as long as there are adequate safeguards in place (Pistorius *et al.*, 2010).

Forest-dwelling communities likely have reason to be sceptical of REDD. Analyses of PES programmes in the past have shown mixed results in their ability to benefit small and poor landholders (Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Pagiola, 2008). Afforestation and reforestation projects registered under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have failed to yield substantial benefits for small and poor landholders, despite having sustainable development as a stated objective (Boyd *et al.*, 2007). The high transaction costs required for PES registration often preclude the participation of these landholders. In addition, many forest-reliant communities are unable to benefit from PES because they lack legal recognition of land claims (Boyd *et al.*, 2007). In Costa Rica, for example, a national law forbade ecosystem service payments to residents lacking legal title. This effectively excluded the participation of many poor and rural farmers and inhibited the programme's effectiveness in some areas (Pagiola, 2008). This suggests that distribution mechanisms may need to go beyond traditional PES in order to ensure REDD equity, effectiveness and efficiency (Ghazoul *et al.*, 2010; Pistorius *et al.*, 2010).

As a result of a push for the sharing of benefits from REDD with forest-dwelling communities and the perception that a strict PES approach would be insufficient for doing so, some conservation practitioners have suggested the inclusion of development components in REDD project implementation plans (Luttrell *et al.*, 2007; Brown *et al.*, 2008). As a result, many early REDD projects include development activities, leading to ICDP-like REDD projects (Collins, 2008; IBRD, 2008; TNC, 2009). Despite the obvious parallels between ICDPs and REDD project implementation, it is unclear whether project implementers are designing and implementing projects that build upon the experiences of ICDPs. What is clear, however, is that if these REDD projects fail to draw on the vast experiences of ICDPs, they are likely to succumb to some of the same pitfalls and weaknesses that have dogged such initiatives for over twenty years.

Lessons learned from ICDPs for REDD implementation

A list of fifteen best practices for ICDPs was identified from a literature review of the successes and failures of ICDPs (adapted from Yaap and Campbell, Chapter 16 of this volume). The relevance of each best practice to REDD was then determined from a review of the REDD literature. The first four ICDP best practices will almost certainly be achieved during the transition from ICDPs to REDD. The subsequent eleven ICDP best practices will require greater diligence if they are to be achieved by REDD projects.

ICDP best practices likely to be achieved by REDD

1 Have measurable and clearly defined goals

ICDPs have been criticized for not clearly defining measurable project goals and for not explicitly identifying the ultimate project goal, whether it be

conservation or development (Robinson and Redford, 2004). The ultimate goal for REDD projects is much clearer: reduced carbon emissions. In addition, progress towards the emission reduction goals of REDD must be clear, measurable and verifiable for payments to occur (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008; Miles and Dickson, 2010; Pistorius *et al.*, 2010).

2 Project duration should reflect the time commitment needed to achieve goals

ICDPs have been routinely criticized for being established on short funding cycles that do not reflect the length of commitment that is required to make their projects work (Sayer and Wells, 2004; Fisher *et al.*, 2005; Chan *et al.*, 2007). In one example from Nepal, ICDP outcomes were improved as the duration of the project increased, reflecting the time commitment needed to change community perceptions and attitudes towards conservation (Baral *et al.*, 2007). The problem of short project duration will likely be overcome by REDD because projects will need to be based on long-term performance in order to ensure the permanence of forest carbon emission reductions (Dutschke and Angelsen, 2008).

3 Markets must be available for participants' products and services

Many ICDPs have encouraged the development of alternative livelihoods for forest-dwelling communities. However, these projects have experienced difficulty in finding markets for the products resulting from these alternative livelihoods. This has acted as a barrier to ICDP success (Fisher *et al.*, 2005). REDD, on the other hand, could provide communities with access to new monetary incentives for forest protection and management (Peskett *et al.*, 2008). Indeed, the ability of REDD to tap into market funding for forest conservation is what attracted many conservationists to the REDD concept in the first place (Kanninen *et al.*, 2007; Ghazoul *et al.*, 2010).

4 Mechanisms should be in place for monitoring and evaluation

ICDPs have struggled in the past with designing appropriate methods for monitoring and evaluating project progress and outcomes. This has prevented ICDP self-assessment and the accumulation of shared experiences that is required for projects to avoid common mistakes (Fisher *et al.*, 2005). It has also prevented the use of adaptive approaches to project management (Salafsky and Margoluis, 2004). Because REDD projects will be performance based, mechanisms for monitoring, reporting and verifying (MRV) emission reductions are a prerequisite for projects (Wertz-Kanounnikoff *et al.*, 2008; Pistorius *et al.*, 2010).

ICDP best practices that require greater diligence during REDD implementation

The first two ICDP best practices in this section are related to contexts in which projects are appropriate. The subsequent nine best practices are related to effective project design.

5 National policies should support project activities

In many cases, national policies and decisions have been some of the most significant barriers to ICDP success (Gezon, 1997; Linkie *et al.*, 2008). At one ICDP in Sumatra, Indonesia, project outcomes were unaffected by project interventions themselves but were highly influenced by the presence of national logging concessions in the project area (Linkie *et al.*, 2008). In the Lower Mekong region, three of the ten main threats to ICDPs are infrastructure, dam and mine projects in or around the project site (Preece *et al.*, Chapter 21 of this volume). These threats are generally the result of national-level negotiations and decisions, as well as of conflicting national policies.

National policies regarding power devolution can also have a major impact on ultimate project success. Effective participatory conservation requires that residents have the power to make decisions regarding the use of their land. This is not compatible with top-down natural resource management, which characterizes natural resource decision-making in many tropical nations (Nanang and Inoue, 2000). Even in countries that have initiated natural resource decentralization, the national government tends to retain *de facto* control over many activities and resources (Larson, 2005).

With regard to REDD, governments will need to consider the environmental externalities of their policies to a greater extent than previously in order to meet emission reduction goals (Kanninen *et al.*, 2007). However, the extent to which national governments are interested in ensuring the equity of REDD is unclear. Participating national governments may hope to retain control over REDD projects in order to maximize the perceived efficiency and monetary returns of projects. This could undermine the ability of communities to actively participate in REDD, which has implications for project equitability, as well as project effectiveness and efficiency (Table 24.1). For example, while Indonesia has already released protocols for REDD, the portion of funding that will reach sub-national levels and the extent to which project management authority will be delegated to sub-national levels are still unclear (Masripatin, 2009). This means REDD implementation in this country may be managed in a top-down fashion, making project equitability more difficult to achieve.

6 Locally-based conservation should be applied where threats and solutions are local

ICDPs have a history of managing threats that emerge from outside the scope of their project particularly poorly. As a result, ICDPs are more successful when

threats to conservation initiatives are largely local than when they are largely external (Robinson and Redford, 2004). This weakness of ICDPs is due to the fact that projects are ineffective at working at the multiple scales needed to address external and landscape-scale threats such as plantation expansion and population migration (Sayer and Wells, 2004).

External threats to REDD at the project level include highly organized illegal logging, landscape-level plantation expansion, immigration to project sites and national infrastructure development (Kanninen *et al.*, 2007). Sub-national projects cannot be expected to independently address these external threats. Instead, they must be dealt with through collaboration between sub-national and national actors, as well as through the use of trade-based initiatives at the international scale (Kanninen *et al.*, 2007). This will likely require collaboration on a scale that has never been previously achieved.

7 Recognize and acknowledge trade-offs between conservation and development

Evaluations of ICDPs have suggested that win-win situations, wherein development goals and conservation goals are achieved in the same project at the same time, are exceedingly rare (Leader-Williams *et al.*, 2010; Anderson *et al.*, Chapter 19 of this volume). Experience suggests instead that conservation and development exist as trade-offs and should be acknowledged and negotiated as such during project planning (McShane and Newby, 2004; Robinson and Redford, 2004; Chan *et al.*, 2007; Sunderland *et al.*, 2008). Confusing the situation is the fact that the costs and benefits of forest conservation accrue at different spatial scales. At the local scale strict conservation may have significant costs for local communities, whereas at the global scale forest conservation provides significant benefits (Kremen *et al.*, 2000). Despite evidence of the existence of trade-offs between conservation and development, ICDPs in the Lower Mekong region score extremely poorly on acknowledging them (Yaap and Campbell, Chapter 16 of this volume).

REDD projects must acknowledge the trade-offs between development and carbon emission reductions. Acknowledging that these trade-offs exist would allow project negotiations to move beyond some of the disproved rhetoric of original ICDPs and towards a more realistic appraisal of the likely impact of conservation (Chan *et al.*, 2007; Sunderland *et al.*, 2008). Although forest management almost universally decreases forest carbon stocks as a result of forest product removal, community forest management will likely be an essential component of many equitable REDD projects (Peskett *et al.*, 2008). Negotiations for the design of projects should acknowledge this trade-off and work towards an agreement that is acceptable for both communities and REDD verifiers and appraisers (Anderson *et al.*, Chapter 19 of this volume).

8 Develop an understanding of community heterogeneity and complexity

Communities are not static and generalizable entities. Instead they can be highly heterogenic and complex. ICDPs have often ignored the complexity and heterogeneity of communities during project planning and implementation. This has contributed to poor project outcomes by leading to resource disputes and capture of project benefits by community elites (Brown, 2004; McShane and Newby, 2004).

Because of the global scale of REDD, there is a major threat that nations will take a “one size fits all” approach to REDD implementation that ignores ethnic and community complexities. Even approaches to REDD that address issues of equitability run the risk of simplifying compensation distribution for the sake of greater project efficiency (Brown *et al.*, 2008). This could lead to elite capture of REDD benefits, which could in turn cause conflicts over compensation. Without adequate compensation, non-elite community members will likely continue to convert and degrade forest. This will lead to ineffective and inefficient projects, as well as “leakage” where deforestation will shift to areas not under REDD agreements (Wunder, 2008; Miles and Dickson, 2010).

9 Develop an understanding of community livelihood needs

In many forest-dwelling communities, forests provide essential building materials, medicine, income and food (Shepherd, 2004). Sustainable and resilient ICDPs have acknowledged and accounted for these needs. This accounting can be achieved by encouraging greater levels of community involvement in project planning (Boissiere *et al.*, 2009).

In the design of REDD projects, the livelihood needs of local communities must be understood and considered a major part of project baseline negotiations and planning. Forest access and management is essential to maintain functioning forest-dwelling communities and cultures (Shepherd, 2004; Mukerjee, 2009). It will also be essential to implementing resilient REDD projects (Peskett *et al.*, 2008). Disagreements over small-scale extraction rights could become a significant point of contention between communities and project implementers if not accounted for during REDD project design.

10 Design projects to be adaptive and flexible

Some assessments of ICDPs have called for projects to adopt adaptive management approaches to project design (Salafsky and Margoluis, 2004; Wells and McShane, 2004). Adaptive management provides continuous interaction between project design, monitoring and management (Allen and Gunderson, 2011). This allows for projects that are flexible enough to respond to project outcomes and changes in context (Salafsky and Margoluis, 2004). In a constantly changing context, the ability of projects to respond to changing contexts is extremely important for project success.

Trees accumulate and store carbon on a much longer time scale than the economic and social cycles that impact changes in rates of deforestation and forest degradation. Therefore, REDD projects that are able to adjust and respond to changing economic and social contexts will likely be more resilient and sustainable than rigidly designed projects. The rigidity of the CDM has been identified as one reason why its system of compensation for reforestation has been inaccessible for poor landholders and largely ineffective (Boyd *et al.*, 2007). The prospect of a changing climate provides additional need for adaptable projects (Allen and Gunderson, 2011). To this end, threat modelling at the landscape scale could be used to inform project interventions under multiple economic and social scenarios (Sandker *et al.*, 2007; Harris *et al.*, 2008).

11 Involve the community in all phases of the project

The majority of first-generation ICDPs were designed in a top-down fashion, in which the rules and guidelines for projects were established by outsiders and community participation was largely symbolic (Sayer and Wells, 2004). Evaluations of ICDPs have called for more collaborative decision-making between project planners and communities (Wells and McShane, 2004). Conceptual models for doing this include adaptive governance (Brunner *et al.*, 2005), adaptive collaborative management (Colfer, 2005), and community-based natural resource management (Fisher *et al.*, 2005). These approaches all emphasize the importance of substantial engagement within and between communities in all aspects of projects, including planning, monitoring and evaluation, and project decision-making. These approaches allow communities to become invested and engaged in projects, which creates long-term project support within the community (Boissiere *et al.*, 2009). Analyses of ICDPs in the Lower Mekong region suggest that community participation and consultation are associated with better conservation outcomes (Preece *et al.*, Chapter 21 of this volume).

For the design of REDD projects, the effectiveness of attempts to integrate communities into substantive dialogues during the planning process will likely determine the equity, and ultimately the effectiveness and efficiency, of projects (Peskett *et al.*, 2008). By taking a bottom-up approach to REDD project planning and implementation, the needs and concerns of communities are more likely to be addressed, understood and considered. Some examples of REDD implementation in Indonesia have not included communities in the planning process (Collins, 2008). In these situations, projects may be difficult to sustain because of a lack of community support. Undoubtedly, not all community demands will result in progress towards emission reduction goals. In these cases, community needs should be negotiated as trade-offs, as described in best practice 7.

12 Collaborate with other projects

It has been suggested that collaboration between and within individual projects greatly facilitates shared learning and integrated project decision-making

(Colfer, 2005). In the past, competing NGOs and practitioners have worked largely independently, reducing the ability of projects to learn from the experiences of other projects (Salafsky and Margoluis, 2004). For example, in Vietnam's Cat Ba National Park, poor communication among organizations working in the area has led to wasted resources and repeated mistakes (Brooks, 2006). Greater collaboration between projects also facilitates landscape-scale conservation, which makes project implementation more effective and more robust (Robinson and Redford, 2004; Fisher *et al.*, 2005; Garnett *et al.*, 2007; Preece *et al.*, Chapter 21 of this volume).

The integration of REDD into the international carbon market has the potential to greatly increase funding to conservation (Dutschke *et al.*, 2008). Because of the large amount of money involved, a highly competitive network of businesses and organizations will likely be involved (Ghazoul *et al.*, 2010). The resulting competitive atmosphere could reduce the likelihood of organizational collaboration that is needed to make conservation more robust and landscape focused. The more conservative funding approach of ODA would reduce inter-project competition; however, this funding source is not likely to provide sufficient long-term financing for REDD (Dutschke *et al.*, 2008; Karsenty, 2008). Therefore finding an approach to REDD financing that encourages collaboration, while ensuring sufficient funding, may be difficult and should be of high priority to negotiators.

13 Engage in activities that you know; collaborate with others for activities that you don't

One pitfall of ICDPs is that they spread themselves too thinly with a wide range of development and conservation activities in an attempt to access a range of funding sources (Roe, 2008). Often these activities are done without specialized expertise. As a result, ICDPs have gained the reputation for doing many things, but none of them particularly effectively (Robinson and Redford, 2004). Preliminary analyses of ICDPs in the Lower Mekong region suggest that ICDP stakeholders are more effective when engaged in strict conservation or strict development activities, as opposed to a mixture of both (Preece *et al.*, Chapter 21 of this volume). The domination of biological conservationists in ICDPs has particularly impaired the ability of project implementers to engage communities in project activities (Chan *et al.*, 2007).

REDD projects should engage experts from a wide range of disciplines: they should include social scientists, public health practitioners, economists and conservationists. A strictly market-based approach to REDD financing may mean that REDD projects will be dominated by economists and financiers. People in these disciplines likely know and care very little about the dynamics of communities or carbon sequestration, but they may be unwilling to delegate responsibility to experts in these fields. This could result in many failed projects unless adequate safeguards are in place (Pistorius *et al.*, 2010).

14 Enforcement is always needed

It would be convenient if effective project design precluded the need for project enforcement. However, this is hardly ever the case. In Indonesia, enforcement of laws and regulations has had a large impact on the eventual success of ICDPs (Wells *et al.*, 1999). Even with community engagement in projects, threats and the need for enforcement will always exist.

In the case of REDD, enforcement will be a significant component and cost of projects (Lubowski, 2008). Regardless of community engagement, not all community members will support REDD activities in their community, and encroachment from outsiders into project areas is likely (Mukerjee, 2009). INTERPOL, an international law enforcement agency, has suggested a greater focus on law enforcement for REDD (Younger, 2009).

15 Provide clear and sustainable community benefits

Some analyses of ICDPs have suggested that providing visible and sustainable benefits for communities at an early stage results in improved outcomes (Chan *et al.*, 2007). Non-monetary development benefits, such as medical supplies and educational tools, are more likely to provide visible and sustained benefits to an entire community. Monetary benefits, on the other hand, may be concentrated in the hands of community elites and may not result in clearly visible and sustainable community-wide benefits.

Providing benefits in a way that strikes an appropriate balance between non-monetary, visible, community-wide benefits and monetary, performance-based benefits may need to be determined on a site-by-site basis for REDD (Luttrell *et al.*, 2007). In communities that have good governance structures for equitably distributing money, it may make sense to distribute only monetary benefits. However, in situations where governance structures and distribution mechanisms are weak, the use of non-monetary benefits may be needed to ensure equity.

Conclusions

This chapter is intended to provide REDD implementers and negotiators with a guide to avoiding the pitfalls and mistakes, while building upon some relative successes of the ICDP conservation approach. It is not intended to suggest that all REDD projects should be designed by following the ICDP framework, or that the preceding best practices will guarantee effective, efficient and equitable REDD, particularly given the current focus of biodiversity and social safeguards for REDD (Pistorius *et al.*, 2010). Clearly REDD is far more complex than the ICDP approach. The ultimate success of REDD depends on the establishment of appropriate and complementary REDD mechanisms at the international and national level in addition to the establishment of appropriate and complementary projects at the sub-national level. However, the experiences of ICDPs show that the design, context and implementation of projects at the local level are extremely important for determining ultimate project success.

This chapter also argues that REDD implementation approaches that build upon the lessons of ICDPs will be more effective, efficient and equitable. There is no doubt that REDD has the potential to provide a new way forward for tropical forest conservation and management. However, we have seen conservation silver bullets before. Market access for non-timber forest products (NTFPs), ICDPs, forest certification and CBNRM were all once believed to be the new way forward for tropical forest conservation. Each of these approaches has turned out to be based on impracticable assumptions when applied in the field and have not met the high expectations set for them. Will REDD be the next example of failed hopes and aspirations? If REDD schemes are designed and implemented in a way that builds upon the lessons of the past, particularly the lessons of ICDPs, then REDD could move tropical conservation forward in a way that these other mechanisms have not done as yet. However, if in the implementation of REDD schemes these lessons are ignored, we will likely be discussing the mistakes of REDD in much the same way that we are currently discussing the mistakes of ICDPs.

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Note

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