This policy brief discusses PES and considerations related to (1) the enabling conditions to implement a PES mechanism and (2) how the mechanism can be pro-poor. PES an incentive-based approach that responds to demands for more direct, flexible, and voluntary conservation approaches has raised interest in its potential to meet development objectives. Before considering how PES can be pro-poor, the brief discusses at least three prerequisites for implementing an effective PES mechanism. These include supportive intermediary organizations and supportive national conditions, such as policies that promote secure property rights, market exchange, and environmental conservation. The brief then goes on to survey some potential opportunities for pro-poor PES, and discusses constraints for the poor's participation and possible negative side-effects of PES programs on the poor. Recommendations are made for practitioners and governments on how to address such concerns. These include strengthening local institutions and conducting simple and rigorous monitoring methods in order to reduce transaction costs, and using land tenure as rewards to include poor people with insecure property rights and ensure their continued access to resources. Finally, the brief concludes by emphasizing the important role of government in promoting pro-poor PES mechanisms
Année de publication
2008
Auteurs
Langue
English
Mots clés
environment, environmental impact, financial situation
Géographique
Indonesia
